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A widespread consensus understands Gideon’s promise to be largely,1 
sadly, unfulfilled.  Yet in truth, we possess precious little hard evidence 
about the state of indigent defense nationally or the actual impact of 
indigent defense policies on the quality of representation received.  A 
burgeoning but little-noted trend in the field could alter that state of 
affairs: the push toward adoption of evidence-based practice.  Put most 
simply, evidence-based practice is a paradigm that aims to tether 
decision-making to empirical, rather than intuitive or experiential, 
evaluations of practice or policy options.  Originating in medicine and 
already taking hold in isolated sectors of criminal justice policy, 
evidence-based practice is sprouting in the indigent defense field, 
spurred on by legislative reform, shifts in federal funding priorities, and 
the concerted energy of thought leaders in a number of states.  The Essay 
shines a light on this trend through close examination of three states—
North Carolina, Texas, and New York—in which indigent defense 
oversight commissions have placed the development of evidence-based 
practice at the front and center of their missions.  Critically assessing the 
prospects for evidence-based indigent defense policymaking, the Essay 
shares in some of the enthusiasm evinced by evidence-based practice’s 
promoters, but also enumerates significant barriers to a full flowering of 
the paradigm, and cautions that an expanded evidence base might, 
ironically, pose barriers to furthering Gideon’s promise of equal access 
to counsel for the indigent. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, which established a 
constitutional right to the provision of counsel to indigent defendants charged with 
felonies in state courts, is an emblem of romantic, rights-protective jurisprudence.  
The storied facts of an indigent, pro se defendant’s determined triumph over an 
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intransigent legal system,
2
 the soaring rhetoric of the opinion,
3
 the synergy 
between the decision and the oft-heralded American adversary system of 
adjudication
4—all these factors combine to preserve Gideon’s place of privilege in 
the criminal procedure pantheon.
5
    
Fifty years hence, a grittier reality serves as backdrop to the right to counsel.  
This is true not only because of the oft-noted disconnect between Gideon’s 
promise of equal access to counsel and the continued, pervasive failure to secure 
quality legal representation (or in a shocking number of cases any legal 
representation) for indigent criminal defendants.
6
  Gideon’s legacy is also a realist 
one in that the important debates today hinge not on further elaboration of the 
decision’s grand principles, but rather on negotiating the practical, institutional, 
political reality of designing systems to deliver the services it promised.  This is in 
large part because Gideon and its progeny have left the details to the devil, as it 
were: In failing to specify how counsel must be funded or provided, or in any 
meaningful sense at what level or quality, the courts in the area have almost fully 
ceded implementation to the technocrats and politicians.
7
  The resulting terrain of 
indigent defense policy and services across the country is a radically varied 
patchwork.  While a majority of states have assumed the funding burden from their 
own coffers, a significant percentage still rely partly or solely on local government 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2   See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963) (reporting Earl Gideon’s famous 
reply to the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel: “The United States Supreme Court says I am 
entitled to be represented by Counsel.”) (internal quotations omitted); see generally LEWIS, supra 
note 1. 
3   See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–45. 
4   See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012) (“The right to the effective assistance 
of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system. . . .  Indeed, the right to counsel is the 
foundation for our adversary system.”); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“[R]eason and reflection require us 
to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. . . .  The right 
of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in 
some countries, but it is in ours.”). 
5   See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Gideon's Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2485–87 (2013) 
(making case that Gideon and right to counsel are treated as first among equals in constitutional 
criminal procedure). 
6   See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 6–8 (2009), available 
at http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf (summarizing 
“persist[ent],” “countless problems” in indigent defense); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty 
Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2152 (2013) 
(“Every day in thousands of courtrooms across the nation, from top-tier trial courts that handle felony 
cases to municipal courts that serve as cash cows for their communities, the right to counsel is 
violated.”); Anthony Lewis, Competent Counsel With Adequate Resources, CHAMPION, Feb. 2003, at 
20, 21 (“[W]e have to take a less romantic view of what was accomplished in [Gideon]. . . .  
Competence is far from assured today in the lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants.”). 
7   See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 54 (1997). 
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to shoulder Gideon’s price.8  Across states, models of service delivery vary from 
public defender offices, to contracts negotiated with private counsel for a given 
volume of cases, to ad hoc assigned counsel systems—and of course also feature 
variations on these themes.
9
  Even within many states, the provision of counsel 
frequently takes different forms, and just as frequently displays varying quality, 
across or even within localities.
10
 
But beyond those broad-brush characterizations, painfully little is known 
about the details of indigent defense in the United States.  Although the decades 
since Gideon have seen scores of task forces, blue ribbon commissions, ad hoc 
assessments, and academic reviews assessing the provision of indigent defense, 
there is still relatively little data, and even less data analysis, that provides insight 
into how systems operate and the quality of outcomes they achieve.
11
  Like much 
of the criminal justice system, indigent defense systems have been operated in 
what Michael Tonry has called an “evidence-free zone.”12  But a new trend may 
change this state of affairs: the increasing adoption of “evidence-based practices” 
(“EBP”) in indigent defense policy.   
Originating in medicine and already influential in other isolated corners of 
criminal justice policy, EBP is, most simply put, decision-making that rests upon 
the best available data supporting a given course of action.
13
  Yet the simple allure 
of this premise belies the conceptual innovation represented by EBP.  Evidence-
based decision-making in health care ran head on into traditions in medical 
education and practice that privileged the individual experience of doctors over 
research in determining courses of treatment, and its adoption has required not 
only the overcoming of professional resistance but also the creation of supportive 
institutional structures for medical education, research, and practice.
14
  Proponents 
of EBP in the criminal justice field face equal if not higher cultural and practical 
hurdles.   
And yet, due largely to the innovative efforts of a handful of EBP 
missionaries, the approach is taking root in the indigent defense field.  This Essay 
shines a descriptive and critical light on this little-noticed area of EBP’s 
flowering.
15
  Critically, the story of EBP is inextricably bound up with another 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8   NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 6, at 53–57.  
9   Id. at 53. 
10  See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATEWIDE INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSIONS 1 (2006) [hereinafter 
SPANGENBERG GROUP REPORT], available at http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/docs/Spangenberg%20 
Group%20Feb%202007.pdf.  
11  See infra Part I.A. 
12  Michael Tonry, Evidence, Ideology, and Politics in the Making of American Criminal 
Justice Policy, 42 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2013). 
13  See infra Part I. 
14  See infra Part I. 
15  Little attention has been given to this trend in the academic literature.  Recent work by Cara 
Drinan has described in enthusiastic terms the contribution that increased data collection has made in 
the indigent defense field.  See Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of 
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critical but under-examined development in indigent defense policy, namely the 
emergence of dedicated state-level oversight commissions.  At least forty-three 
states have some form of office or agency charged with indigent defense oversight, 
but the form of these entities varies tremendously—from statewide public defender 
offices that manage their own personnel, to state indigent defense commissions 
that monitor services designed and provided by autonomous local systems, to 
variations thereon.
16
  In a small handful of states that are recent adopters of the 
oversight commission structure, these entities have provided the impetus, energy, 
expertise, and institutional structure to take on the mission of developing evidence-
based practices in their respective states’ indigent defense policymaking.   
To be sure, the promise of evidence-based policy in indigent defense remains 
far, very far, from being fully realized.  But it is high time to take stock of the 
premise of EBP’s feasibility and desirability in the field.  As the Essay will 
explore, states are increasingly tasking indigent defense service providers and 
oversight bodies with data-gathering and research, the federal government and 
other grant funders are prioritizing resources for developing an indigent defense 
evidence base, and indigent defense advocates are increasingly trying to leverage 
available evidence to attract greater political support and funding  In a world of 
finite resources for the field, what is the push toward evidence-based policy 
buying, and is it worth the cost?  This Essay takes only a preliminary pass at those 
questions, evaluating potential contributions that EBP might make to the quality of 
indigent defense policies, political support for them, and the ability to achieve 
gains through Sixth Amendment litigation.  The Essay’s bottom line is perhaps 
best characterized as cautious support for pushing forward with EBP in the field, 
but with pragmatic mindfulness of the paradigm’s limits as well as its potential to 
introduce new vulnerabilities into the technical, political, and legal calculus of 
indigent defense reform.   
The Essay proceeds as follows:  Part I traces the origins of evidence-based 
practice in the medical field and its spotty migration to the domain of criminal 
justice, and sets forth the leading arguments in favor of evidence-based criminal 
justice practices and significant points of skepticism.  Part II turns to the 
comparatively recent attention to developing evidence-based indigent defense 
                                                                                                                                                   
Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1322–25 (2013).  In a forthcoming 
article, Pamela Metzger and Andrew Ferguson offer a theoretical framework for and propose a number of 
concrete programs by which defender organizations could better integrate data into management of defense 
services.  See Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2279203.  Importantly, as this Essay will 
explore, data collection alone is a necessary but far from sufficient condition to generate evidence-based practice.  
Ron Wright and Ralph Peeples recently proposed an intriguing evidence-based framework of their own design 
to rate individual defense attorneys.  See generally Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal 
Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221, 1232–33 
(2013).  These important and innovative proposals have not, however, given sustained descriptive or 
critical attention to the sort of systemic evidence-based practice toward which the commissions 
highlighted in the Essay are working. 
16  See infra notes 63–65. 
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policy.  It focuses on the three state commissions that are arguably in the vanguard 
of the trend in North Carolina, Texas, and New York.  The account highlights the 
origins, design, and contributions of the three commissions in relation to EBP, 
aiming not only to describe the work of each entity but also to permit some 
comparison among them, as well as to develop a basis for the analysis that follows 
in Part III.  Part III offers what in the limits of this space can be only highly 
provisional critical analysis of the EBP trend.  It assesses a posited best case for the 
pursuit of EBP in indigent defense—its potential to reveal higher quality practices, 
to garner greater political support for the field, and to productively fuel Sixth 
Amendment litigation—and considers a number of potential risks and pitfalls that 
EBP—especially in a (realistically) incomplete, incremental form—might 
introduce to the field.  In closing, the Essay reflects on potential tensions between 
EBP’s empirical quality assessments and the constitutional commitment that 
Gideon embodies. 
 
I. THE ALLURE OF EVIDENCE 
 
Some two decades ago, a handful of upstarts in the medical field began 
peddling a radical notion: that medical care should reflect the “conscientious, 
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the 
care of individual patients.”17  Dubbing this paradigm “evidence-based medicine,” 
proponents aimed to enhance the quality, uniformity, and cost-effectiveness of 
health care by integrating the experiential knowledge base of doctors with the 
empirical findings of published studies and other sources of high quality medical 
data.
18
  The shift was more radical than those outside the medical profession might 
initially appreciate.  Despite the field’s scientific foundations, medical decision-
making, both at the level of patient care and as to the design of service delivery 
structures, has traditionally been done in isolation from research; by some surveys 
a mere fifteen percent of treatment decisions are evidence-based, meaning based 
on experimentally derived information about effectiveness (“Clinical trials 
demonstrated improvement in half of patients.”) rather than sheer anecdote (“In my 
twenty years of experience my patients have all felt better with this”).19  
Traditionally operating with “the ‘physician-as-expert’ model of care [which] 
relies on an individual physician’s extensive knowledge, experience, and 
memory,” the medical profession met evidence-based medicine movement with 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
17  David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. 
MED. J. 71, 71 (1996). 
18  See, e.g., Lucian L. Leape et al., What Practices Will Most Improve Safety?, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
501, 501 (2002); Sackett et al., supra note 17; MARK B. MCCLELLAN ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND THE 
CHANGING NATURE OF HEALTHCARE: 2007 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE MEETING SUMMARY 1–2 (2008), available at 
http://www.amcp.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12470.   
19  See Jeffrey Pfeffer & Robert I. Sutton, Evidence-Based Management, HARV. BUS. REV. Jan. 
2006, at 62, 64; see also MCCLELLAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 35–38. 
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significant skepticism.
20
  Practically, the autonomous physician-as-expert simply 
lacks capacity to digest the massive array of research filling the pages of medical 
journals.  Moreover, despite a vast number of professional journals and a long 
history of medical research, good evidence is in fact hard to come by in the field.  
For example, clinicians often must extrapolate from data on dissimilar populations, 
and rarely have access to analyses of the comparative effectiveness of treatments.
21
  
Normatively, medical professionals were skeptical of the valuing of clinical 
research over acquired experience, and the looming threat of cost concerns 
overriding clinical judgment.
22
  Nevertheless, evidence-based medicine appears 
here to stay, especially as recent health care reform laws have made significant 
investments in medical data gathering and usage.
23
  
The barriers to evidence-based practice in the criminal justice system are 
arguably more significant than in medicine.  Ask the average police chief why her 
officers patrol by car rather than by foot, or the average probation officer why he 
recommended a particular sentence on a given set of facts, and the answer would 
most likely be some version of, “That’s the way we’ve always done it.”24  The 
professional inclination is in part a result of the still-thin research base supporting 
the field, which has emerged to a still-limited extent only in the last three to four 
decades since the formation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 
1967, and, to a much greater extent, its successor entities the National Institute of 
Justice and the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
25
  But producing research that would 
provide an evidence base to guide criminal justice decision-making is challenged 
by a diffuse and inadequate data infrastructure: thousands of administratively 
distinct agencies spread among federal, state, and local governments with, for the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
20  MCCLELLAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 47–48. 
21  See id at 35–38. 
22  See Evidence-Based Practice Working Group, Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach 
to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2420, 2423–24 (1992). 
23  See Richard S. Saver, Health Care Reform's Wild Card: The Uncertain Effectiveness of 
Comparative Effectiveness Research, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2147, 2150–51 (2011). 
24  See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, 
and Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 378–79 (2013); Michael Tonry, Evidence, Ideology, and 
Politics in the Making of American Criminal Justice Policy, 42 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2013). 
25  See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department 
of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 294–95 (2013) (recounting the history of the creation of the NIJ); 
Lawrence W. Sherman, Research and Policing: The Infrastructure and Political Economy of Federal 
Funding, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 156, 163–65 (2004) (discussing transition from 
LEAA to NIJ); Research Agenda and Goals, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
http://www.nij.gov/about/Pages/research-agenda.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); Justice Assistance 
Grant (JAG) Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 
https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=59#horizontalTab1 (last visited Mar. 7, 
2015). 
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most part, insufficiently detailed internal data and surprisingly low levels of 
automation.
26
 
Nevertheless, the winds of change are blowing.  Evidence-based practice has 
emerged as the leading edge of reform in isolated pockets of the criminal justice 
system—particularly policing and sentencing.27  For example, police departments 
around the country have adopted some version of the COMPSTAT initiative 
pioneered by the New York City Police Department in the mid-1990s, which 
enabled the gathering and analysis of a multitude of data on crime and police 
staffing in order to guide decision-making on where and how to prioritize police 
resources.
28
  In the realm of corrections, EBP has led an increasing number of 
jurisdictions to adopt sentencing regimes under which the appropriate length of 
incarceration is dictated by an offender’s numerical recidivism risk assessment, 
calculated on the basis of variables (such as demographic characteristics and 
criminal history) empirically shown to correlate with re-offending.
29
  Other 
examples are not legion, but numerous enough to constitute a trend.
30
  The shift 
has a number of interactive causes, most prominent among them (1) the cumulative 
effect of recent decades of federal grant money, which has over time permitted 
initial and follow-up research evaluating criminal justice propositions and 
programs, especially in policing and corrections;
31
 (2) increasing adoption of 
automated data collection technologies, often thanks to federal grant funding;
32
 (3) 
evangelism of key EBP enthusiasts in the field, such as past and current NYPD 
Commissioner William Bratton, who championed COMPSTAT;
33
 (4) rising costs 
and shrinking state and local budgets sparking a push for cost analysis and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
26  See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Michael S. Scott & Walter J. Dickey, Reimagining Criminal 
Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 996–97 (2010) (noting that few criminal justice agencies “collect and 
track data in a way that facilitates analysis”); Ronald F. Wright, Fragmented Users of Crime 
Predictions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 92–93 (2010) (discussing late and spotty adoption of data-gathering 
and analysis technology); see also Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally 
Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2005) (discussing limitation of too-general data in tracking death sentencing 
process); Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and Change: Into 
the Twenty-First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55, 75–76 (2010) (discussing limitation of too-general 
data for researching policing). 
27  See Tonry, supra note 24, at 3–5, 12.   
28  See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, 
and Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 378–79 (2013). 
29  See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809–14 (2014). 
30  See, e.g., Jon B. Gould, Overwhelming Evidence, 95 JUDICATURE 61, 61 (2011); Tonry, 
supra note 24, at 3–5. 
31  See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Joan Petersilia, NIJ and Its Research Program, in THE NAT’L 
INST. OF JUST., TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 9, 11–33 (1994), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/151287.pdf. 
32  Wright, supra note 26, at 91, 93. 
33  Sherman, supra note 28, at 381.  
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programmatic accountability by criminal justice agencies;
34
 and (5) the emergence 
of previously unimagined political coalitions, loosely grouped under the “Smart on 
Crime” banner, that have united liberals and conservatives, pro-defense and pro-
law enforcement interests in support of progressive criminal justice reforms 
(including alternatives to incarceration and deprioritizing prosecution of low-level 
offenses) that are cost-effective and evidence-based.
35
    
To most observers, the arrival of evidence-based practice in criminal justice 
has been cause for celebration.  Empirical data, say proponents, is virtually 
guaranteed to make decision makers’ assessments of prospective outcomes more 
accurate, more standardized, and more amenable to assessment.
36
  Evidence-based 
practice is also held out as enhancing the quality of decision-making in a more 
foundational sense: Many advocates of EBP reason that data will garner support 
for progressive policy options that might otherwise be reflexively opposed, 
particularly where documentation of potential cost savings can cut through 
otherwise politically polarized debates.  As Sonia Starr has explained in the 
sentencing context, advocates of EBP “frame it as a strategy for reducing 
incarceration and the resulting budgetary costs and social harms,” and “suggest 
that, absent scientific information about risk, judges probably err on the side of 
longer sentences.”37  Empirical evidence on this account provides political cover 
and enables coalition-building—such as the smart-on-crime movement—for 
reforms that might otherwise be perceived as anti-law-enforcement, pro-defense, 
or otherwise politically unpalatable.
38
   
But there is cause for skepticism.  From a practical standpoint, the push for 
evidence-based decision-making in criminal justice faces arguably larger hurdles 
than the fields from which the paradigm has migrated.  Quality data, as discussed 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
34  See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 
429 (2012); Matthew J. Parlow, The Great Recession and Its Implications for Community Policing, 
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1193, 1218 (2012). 
35  Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American 
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 597, 610 (2011); DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/smart-on-crime.pdf. 
36  See Starr, supra note 29, at 815; Gould, supra note 30, at 62.   
37  See Starr, supra note 29, at 816; see also Klingele, supra note 34, at 444–45. 
38  See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 581, 639–40 (2012) (“Telling the public that rehabilitation can work, and providing data 
on how the  shared interest in safety and reform is served, is more effective in building coalitions to 
facilitate progress than preaching from a particular normative world view. The powerful potential of 
rehabilitation pragmatism is demonstrated by the very recent call among conservatives for bipartisan 
examination of rehabilitative programs as an alternative to the crippling fiscal and human costs of 
maintaining high rates of incarceration.”).  But see Klingele, supra note 34, at 448 (“While the use of 
risk assessment instruments (blunt as they often are, in both design and execution) has helped 
increase the willingness of parole boards in places like Mississippi to release more individuals 
labeled as low risk, experience suggests that attention to risk provides little protection against public 
backlash.”). 
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above, is notoriously difficult to come by, as is research that displays the empirical 
rigor that EBP touts; controlled experiments, for example, are difficult to carry out 
for questions of interest to criminal justice policymaking.
39
  Assuming access to 
data, the difficulty of arriving at consensus-generating metrics for measuring 
programmatic quality will at times suppress the potential for “evidence” to cut 
through political divides.
40
  For example, determining whether the best measure of 
the quality of a stop-and-frisk program the number of arrests, the number of 
charges brought, the amount of contraband recovered, the sense of satisfaction of 
members of the community, or some other measure is far from a value-neutral 
process.
41
  The often morally and ideologically fraught nature of criminal justice 
policy is apt to create a kind of confirmation bias that either amplifies or 
diminishes the salience of research depending on whether it confirms or 
disconfirms prior beliefs.
42
     
Beyond the possibility that EBP cannot achieve what it promises in criminal 
justice lies the risk that the paradigm could do harm.  The fact that legislators and 
criminal justice professionals frequently lack quantitative training and comfort 
with empirical research creates significant potential for data to be put to 
inappropriate use.
43
  For example, one of the several grounds on which Sonia Starr 
criticizes reliance on recidivism risk scores to dictate sentencing outcomes is that 
the evidence, such as it is, does not predict the thing that judges need to know: how 
the sentencing will affect a defendant’s recidivism risk.  Instead, judges only know 
“how ‘risky’ [an offender] is in the abstract,” and “[t]here is no particular reason to 
believe that groups that recidivate at higher rates are also more responsive to 
incarceration.”44  There is, separately, the difficulty of applying evidence to a new 
context, as when a policymaker concludes that a successful program in jurisdiction 
X will work in jurisdiction Y: Assessing the accuracy of that conclusion requires a 
nuanced examination of whether the causal features of the first success are in place 
in the new context, an examination that policymakers may not be inclined or able 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
39  See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text; see also Greg Berman, Aubrey Fox, Why 
Good Programs Go Bad Learning from Failure, 26 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2011, at 45, 49 (discussing 
difficulty of experimental research).  Occasionally, opportunities for “natural experiments” arise and 
are exploited by researchers.  See, e.g., James M. Anderson, Paul Heaton, How Much Difference 
Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 
154, 156, 159 (2012). 
40  Cf. MCCLELLAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 169–71 (discussing analytical challenges in 
measuring outcomes in healthcare). 
41  This debate featured prominently in the New York stop and frisk litigation.  See Floyd v. 
City of New York, 910 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing dueling expert analyses).   
42  See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 12, at 4, 7, 9.  On the phenomenon of confirmation bias, see 
generally Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 
114 Q. J. ECON. 37 (1999). 
43  See, e.g., Gould, supra note 30, at 62, 66. 
44  Starr, supra note 29, at 855–57. 
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to undertake.
45
  And some have voiced concern that the push to justify programs 
with research might have the perverse effect of suppressing innovation, both 
because untested programs may struggle to garner support or funding, and because 
programs that “fail” once are unlikely to be tried again under conditions that might 
enhance their prospects for success.
46
 
Finally, there is a more foundational concern that EBP may be in tension with 
core values underlying our criminal justice system.  Exemplary is Bernard 
Harcourt’s critique of COMPSTAT-style policing programs, evidence-based 
sentencing, and similar criminal justice initiatives that premise crime and 
punishment policy on the likelihood that individuals will commit offenses in the 
future.
47
  Harcourt argues that such policies run counter to a retributive-based 
punishment theory, which ties punishment to (and only to) the extent of moral 
breach constituted by the subject offense.
48
  Additionally, Sonia Starr’s work has 
illuminated the extent to which evidence-based sentencing, in relying on factors 
such as sex, race, and income to increase offenders’ terms of incarceration, may be 
contrary to constitutional obligations and in tension with the broader ideological 
commitment of fair and equal treatment.
49
  Such criticisms do not, of course, 
suggest that criminal justice decision-making should not be informed by data and 
research, but rather urge attentiveness to particular contexts in which going where 
the evidence leads might take one over a line drawn by non-scientific 
precommitments.   
 
II. EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE MEETS INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM 
 
Despite fifty years of work to fulfill Gideon’s promise, there exists 
surprisingly little of what counts as “evidence” guiding decision-making in the 
indigent defense field.
50
  Researchers have assembled some information, usually 
sobering, about system attributes such as defender caseloads or rates of pay.
51
  But 
such studies are typically ad hoc, crisis-driven reports rather than the result of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
45  See, e.g., GREG BERMAN & EMILY GOLD, FROM CHICAGO TO BROOKLYN: A CASE STUDY IN 
PROGRAM REPLICATION  6–8 (2011), available at  http://www.courtinnovation.org 
/sites/default/files/documents/Chicago_Brooklyn.pdf; David Dannels & Heather Smith, 
Implementation Challenges of Intelligence Led Policing in a Quasi-Rural County, 24 J. CRIME & 
JUST. 103 (2001).  See generally NANCY CARTWRIGHT & JEREMY HARDIE, EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DOING IT BETTER 3–13 (2012). 
 
47  See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007); see also supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text 
(discussing COMPSTAT and evidence-based sentencing). 
48  See generally HARCOURT, supra note 47. 
49  See Starr, supra note 29, at 821–38. 
50  See, e.g., NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 6, at 190, 199; THE SPANGENBERG 
GROUP REPORT, supra note 10, at 10, 20–21; Norman Reimer, A Call to Action in Support of the 
Right to Counsel: Federal Right—Federal Responsibility, CHAMPION, June 2009, at 7, 7–8.  
51  See supra note 6.  
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ongoing data-gathering and analysis that would permit tracking and comparison 
over time, or systematic program evaluation that could serve as an affirmative 
guide to action.
52
  Moreover, the available data to support meaningful research in 
the field has traditionally been woefully inadequate.  Few of the thousands of 
governmental and private indigent defense providers gather data of any granular 
interest—for example, reporting what tasks are actually performed by an attorney 
in an individual case as opposed to aggregate disbursements to investigators or 
experts; what minimal data is gathered is rarely subject to ongoing monitoring or 
analysis; and comparison among jurisdictions (or even within jurisdictions, such as 
assessing parity in defense attorney and prosecutor caseloads or pay) is 
confounded by the lack of uniformity in basic definitions such as what constitutes 
a “case.”53   
But the gap between current practice and EBP is even more fundamental, and 
arguably more substantial than in other criminal justice arenas.  Imagine a research 
environment in which criminologists not only disagreed on whether arrests 
prevented crime, but also on whether crime prevention was a proper quality metric 
for policing, or one in which not only was the link between incarceration and non-
recidivism unknown, but the value of non-recidivism disputed.
54
  This 
approximates the research environment for indigent defense, in that the field lacks 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
52  Exemplary are the many reports assembled by the Spangenberg Group, one of the most 
authoritative sources of indigent defense research in the country, but which is typically called in to 
produce one-off assessments of state systems in crisis, or nationwide surveys that provide only a very 
high-level sketch of indigent defense trends.  See Indigent Defense Studies, THE SPANGENBERG 
GROUP, http://www.spangenberggroup.com/work_indig.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).   
53  See, e.g., Joel M. Schumm, Conference Report: Padilla and the Future of the Defense 
Function, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 24–25 (2011) (discussing widespread absence of basic data about 
defense work, including time records); Wright & Peeples, supra note 15, at 1232–33 (“The quality of 
data available for any given criminal case is shallow and appalling, even though the sheer number of 
cases is impressive.”); David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The 
Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 L. & INEQUALITY 371, 380 (2014) (“There is not good data with respect 
to the hours spent by defenders on their work.”); NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 
6, at 97–98, 199 (describing lack of data and stating priority need for uniform case reporting); MAREA 
BEEMAN, USING DATA TO SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE PUBLIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS 6, 10 (2012), available 
at http://texaswcl.tamu.edu/reports/2012_JMI_Using_Data_in_Public_Defense.pdf (summarizing 
data wish list).  To a large extent, the data limitations in this field are a symptom of the broader lack 
of coordination of or attention to data in the criminal justice system.  Information from courts, 
prosecutors’ offices, police departments, and other agencies is often relevant to tracking and 
evaluating case inputs and outcomes, but is often nonexistent, difficult to access, difficult to 
coordinate with other system data, or otherwise unusable.  See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying 
text. 
54  This is not to suggest that crime reduction or non-recidivism are exclusive or non-
controversial measures of quality in policing or sentencing, but rather to posit that these goals are 
widely acknowledged as important, at the top of a relatively short list of potential instrumental 
programmatic goals.  See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law 
Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 
419, 419–20. (2011); Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Punishment and Beyond: Achieving 
Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1, 14 (2009). 
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any systematic understanding of how system inputs—attorney practices, client 
characteristics, compensation or hours spent—relate to desired outcomes, as well 
as any agreed-upon framework for stating and measuring what the desired 
outcomes are.  Whether quality defense representation is evidenced by acquittals, 
favorable sentencing outcomes, charge reductions, pretrial release, protecting 
constitutional rights, sheer client satisfaction, or some mix of the above is a matter 
on which no consensus exists.
55
  Thus, while the provision of defense services is 
guided by an array of influential professional standards for practice,
56
 little of that 
guidance could accurately be called evidence-based as opposed to the product of 
collective experience and observation.
57
  And while indigent defense is universally 
viewed as underfunded, the truth is the field lacks an objective means of 
quantifying how much money its services do or should cost, or what a reduction in 
the ability to provide particular services means from the standpoint of quality.
58
   
An incipient effort to change this state of affairs is afoot, however, among 
independent researchers and in a small handful of jurisdictions that are aiming at 
broader national influence.  The trend is prompted in part by the same factors 
driving EBP in criminal justice generally,
59
 though indigent defense is far later to 
the data game than even other sectors of the system.  An important reason for this 
lag is almost certainly the near-total neglect of defense services by federal grant 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
55  See Tony Fabelo, What Policy-Makers Need to Know to Improve Indigent Defense Systems, 
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 135, 150 (2004); MARGARET A. GRESSENS & DARYL V. 
ATKINSON, THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING INDIGENT DEFENSE: NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEMS 
EVALUATION PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES GUIDE 1–2 (2012), available at 
http://www.ncids.org/systems%20evaluation%20project/performancemeasures/PM_guide.pdf. 
56  See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, EIGHT 
GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 2–15 (2009), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_
guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf; STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1–3 (2002), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenpri
nciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993); NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS, Ch. 13, The Defense (1973), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Standards_For_The_Defense; see also Drinan, 
supra note 15 (hailing standards as key step enhancing quality of indigent defense). 
57  See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC 
DEFENSE 43–49 (2011) (describing influence of National Advisory Commission standards despite 
widely perceived inadequacies and lack of evidence base); see generally Martin Marcus, The Making 
of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards Forty Years of Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 10 
(describing emphasis on consensus among stakeholders and drawing on collective experience in 
drafting of ABA standards); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 6, at 66 (noting lack of 
empirical basis for caseload standards).  Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, 
J., concurring in judgment) (cautioning reliance on ABA standards in ineffective assistance case law 
as “such standards may represent only the aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical 
assessment of actual practice”). 
58  See Fabelo, supra note 55, at 150. 
59  See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
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programs as compared to policing and other sectors.
60
  This circumstance has 
begun to be modestly ameliorated by the Department of Justice’s recent efforts to 
prioritize and promote funding of indigent defense research and innovation, 
coming in part under the umbrella of the 2010-created Access to Justice program.
61
  
Consistent with the approach of NIJ and BJA to the criminal justice field more 
broadly, grant funding aimed at the indigent defense field efforts has expressly 
prioritized the development and promotion of an evidence base, especially in 
support of cost-efficient programming.
62
  And the federal commitment has begun, 
slowly, to contribute to the development of an evidence base concerning indigent 
defense practices, with NIJ funds having supported several significant studies 
comparing defendant outcomes based on attorney type since 2010.
63
 
An equally if not more critical change in the landscape of indigent defense 
that is fueling the evidence-based trend, however, is the relatively recent creation 
of dedicated structures for EBP in the form of state indigent defense oversight 
commissions.  The move toward institutionalizing oversight for indigent defense 
services has been one critical response to the interconnected ills of 
decentralization, low funding, and poor quality that have plagued the field for 
virtually all fifty years of Gideon’s influence.  First seen in the 1970s in the form 
of statewide public defender offices, and later taking more varied forms—as 
independent state commissions with full control over defense services, specialized 
state-wide defense organizations, agencies with limited authority to set standards 
or monitor quality, and other models
64—formal indigent defense oversight now 
exists in forty-four states plus the District of Columbia.
65
  The most recent wave of 
commission formation, which occurred since 2000, has seen the formation of 
eleven new oversight bodies, mostly taking the form of independent state 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
60  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE: DOJ COULD INCREASE 
AWARENESS OF ELIGIBLE FUNDING AND BETTER DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH FUNDS HELP 
SUPPORT THIS PURPOSE (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590736.pdf (showing 
miniscule devotion of Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants, BJA’s major grant 
program for state programs, to indigent defense). 
61  See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Gideon—A Watershed Moment, CHAMPION, June 2012, at 56, 56 
(discussing launch of Access to Justice program and related grant money). 
62  See The Access to Justice Initiative, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atj (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2015); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, EXPERT WORKING GROUP REPORT: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 1, 9, 41 (2011), available at 
https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/236022.pdf. 
63  See Indigent Defense Publications, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atj/idp 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
64  See SPANGENBERG GROUP REPORT, supra note 10, at 16–31 (discussing various models). 
65  See Id. at 3 (showing table of forty-two commissions and year of creation); Quality 
Enhancement Distributions, NYS OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, https://www.ils.ny.gov (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2014) (showing creation of New York commission in 2011 subsequent to 
Spangenberg study).  Michigan created an indigent defense commission in 2013, to replace a minimal 
form of statewide oversight that had existed in the form of its appellate defender office.  See MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 780 (2013). 
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commissions, and many with data-collection and analysis as part of their formal 
legislative charges.
66
  Statewide public defender offices, too, have begun to attend 
to the creation of systems for ongoing data collection, such as tracking caseloads 
and (to a lesser extent) attorney time on particular matters.
67
 
Some oversight bodies have gone farther, beyond mere data collection to the 
pursuit of evidence-based policymaking.  This Part highlights the work of three 
commissions that are leading the EBP push—in North Carolina, Texas, and New 
York.  These three commissions are not the only state oversight bodies that are 
engaged in data gathering and evaluation,
68
 but they are certainly the key movers 
and shakers promoting the development of evidence-based policy in the field; to 
describe their work is to describe the vanguard of the trend.  The discussion aims 
to describe and compare each commission’s genesis, structure, and contributions in 
relation to evidence-based practices,
69
 highlighting features of the commissions 
and their work that will provide the grist for Part III’s assessment of EBP in 
indigent defense.  
 
A. North Carolina 
 
The North Carolina Indigent Defense Services Commission was born in 2000 
as the central recommendation of a legislative task force formed to grapple with 
the state’s evident indigent defense crisis.70  At the time, North Carolina was one 
of twenty-two states that had already assumed full responsibility for indigent 
defense funding,
71
 but the management of the provision of services, from the 
selection of a delivery method to the hiring and compensation of attorneys, was 
largely controlled by the state’s one-hundred counties.  While the state’s 
Administrative Office of the Courts had the nominal duty to manage the state’s 
investment, it had “no control over the fees that judges award . . . no staff to 
dedicate to financial or policy management of programs, and lack[ed] adequate 
resources for an automation system for the collection  . . . of good data.”72  As 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
66  See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 62; Norman Lefstein, The Movement Towards 
Indigent Defense Reform: Louisiana and Other States, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 125, 126–27 (2008) 
(noting recent commissions in North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, North Dakota, Montana, South 
Carolina, and Louisiana); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.989(f) (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-
1-105(f) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE §54-61-04(1)(d) (2014). 
67  See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 15, at 1333–35 (discussing efforts by Missouri and Miami-
Dade County public defenders to track cases in connection with litigation). 
68  See supra note 66 (noting examples of Michigan, Montana, and North Dakota featuring 
statutory data mandates). 
69  Developing an indigent defense evidence base is of course only one small component of the 
charge of all three commissions.  This essay does not take on the task of fully describing or 
evaluating the oversight work of these entities. 
70  INDIGENT DEFENSE STUDY COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 2, 8 (2000), 
available at http://www.ncids.org/home/ids%20study%20commission%20report.pdf. 
71  Id. at 4. 
72  Id. at 7. 
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expenditures spiraled, the state lacked any effective mechanism of even accounting 
for, much less controlling, either the cost or quality of defense services; indeed, the 
task force reported that its own work was significantly hampered by the data 
vacuum.
73
  Consequently, the task force identified as the highest reform priority 
the establishment of an entity charged with centralized management of the 
provision of indigent defense across the state.
74
 
The legislature responded with the Indigent Defense Services Act of 2000, 
which created an independent agency within the judicial branch, the Office of 
Indigent Defense Services (“IDS Office”), and a thirteen-member Commission to 
govern its work.
75
  The Act clearly reflects the trifecta of quality, cost, and control 
concerns: The purpose of the Office and Commission’s work is the enhancement 
of oversight, quality, and uniformity in defense services; the production of 
“reliable statistical information in order to evaluate the services provided and funds 
expended;” and the delivery of “services in the most efficient and cost-effective 
manner without sacrificing quality representation.”76  The IDS Office and 
Commission’s core responsibilities are, first, standard-setting for indigent defense 
provision throughout the state on quality-related matters such as attorney 
qualifications and caseload levels, and second, to select the method of indigent 
defense service delivery and the manner and rate of compensation for attorneys in 
each county or district.
77
  As a matter of statute the Commission’s authority to set a 
services delivery regime is constrained by an obligation to consult with the bench 
and bar in each district.
78
  In point of fact, in the initial selection process after 
enactment of the Indigent Services Act, the Commission essentially acceded to the 
existing service plans submitted by each locality, which typically were the same 
assigned counsel systems that the counties had in place before the Act was 
adopted.
79
  Although the Commission could in theory have used its authority and 
its consultation mandate to urge adoption of different models, the political 
tenuousness of its position as a new oversight entity militated against such 
boldness.
80
   
The creation of the IDS Office and Commission (collectively, “IDS”) 
launched North Carolina into the vanguard of evidence-based practice in indigent 
defense.  IDS was among the first—if not the first—state oversight entity 
statutorily charged with a data-driven mission,
81
 and the first to institutionalize 
data collection and analysis by devoting one of only five initial full-time staff 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
73  Id. at 1. 
74  Id. at 2. 
75  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7A-498.2–.5 (West 2014). 
76  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-498.1 (West 2014). 
77  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7A-498.5(d) – (f) (West 2014). 
78  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-498.2(e) (West 2014). 
79  See Interview with Thomas Maher, Sept. 4, 2014 (notes on file with author) [hereinafter 
Maher Interview]. 
80  See id. 
81  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-498.1 (West 2014). 
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positions to a dedicated researcher.
82
  (The Office now has three research staff 
positions, one of which is vacant, and a total office staff of twenty-five.)
83
  The 
Office’s research team—led by a seasoned quantitative researcher with substantial 
program monitoring experience outside the criminal justice context—has both 
direct access to data through its monitoring functions—for example, direct 
reporting of case numbers and outcomes by the state’s public defender offices84—
as well as data from other state agencies such as the Administrative Office of 
Courts.
85
  The Office has worked since its founding to facilitate expanded data 
collection by other agencies—persuading, for example, the Administrative Office 
of Courts to collect more detailed information about the types of cases in which 
indigent defendants are represented, so that caseload data reveals more information 
about the seriousness and time-intensiveness of an attorney’s workload.86  Equally 
significantly, the Office successfully expanded North Carolina’s use of technology 
to gather and track data, establishing in-house databases, persuading public 
defender offices to use time tracking and case management software, and adopting 
a data integration program that enables automated data sharing among various 
court information systems and the Office, enhancing the Office’s ability to analyze 
and report.
87
   
The Office’s systematic data analysis efforts had early concrete benefits to its 
quality-enhancement mission.  For example, the Office conducted a series of 
studies comparing the costs of the state’s public defender offices and privately 
appointed counsel—the latter still constituting the majority of indigent defense 
provision in North Carolina.  Those studies were able to demonstrate that public 
defenders were by and large more economical than privately appointed counsel, 
and also that public defenders achieved comparatively superior outcomes for 
clients along several measures, and have contributed to legislative support for the 
expansion of public defender offices.
88
  The ability to track expenses and caseloads 
on a continuous basis has also insulated the Office (and defense services statewide) 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
82  See Interview with Margaret Gressens, Sept. 15, 2014 [hereinafter Gressens Interview] 
(notes on file with author). 
83  See IDS Central Office, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT SERVICES, 
http://www.ncids.org/IDS%20Office/IDS_Staff.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
84  See N.C. COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SERVICES 10 (2014), available at http://www.ncids.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Prior 
%20GA%20Reports/LegislatureReport2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 IDS REPORT]. 
85  See 2014 IDS Report, supra note 84, at 28; Gressens Interview, supra note 82. 
86  N.C. COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SERVICES 18 (2005), available at http://www.ncids.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Prior 
%20GA%20Reports/Legislature%20Report%202005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 IDS REPORT]. 
87  2014 IDS REPORT, supra note 84, at 28; 2005 IDS REPORT, supra note 86, at 4, 18. 
88  See, e.g., N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, FY 07 NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC 
DEFENDER AND PRIVATE ASSIGNED COUNSEL COST ANALYSIS 2–3 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncids.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Prior%20Publications/fy07%20pd%20pac%20cba%20
final%20report.pdf (reporting cost comparisons and noting prior studies since 2002); see also 
Gressens Interview, supra note 82 (discussing legislative support for public defenders). 
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against potential legislative criticism.  Indigent defense expenditures began to 
grow after operations commenced, with the data demonstrating that per case costs 
were actually lower but that the volume of cases handled by appointed counsel and 
public defenders had grown.
89
  
While these early data-driven efforts were groundbreaking, they were 
themselves limited.  The IDS Office could develop a wide range of statistical 
information describing what was occurring in the provision of indigent defense.  
What the Office lacked, however, was any mechanism of quantifying the quality of 
outcomes from those efforts, and thereby measuring the relative value of various 
possible policies.
90
  This disabled the Office from carrying out one of its core 
statutory missions, namely, engagement in cost-effectiveness analysis, whereby the 
lowest cost option of achieving a given value or quality level is identified.
91
  Thus, 
for example, if public defender offices cost more than private assigned counsel but 
produce superior outcomes, cost-effectiveness analysis might conclude that the 
public defender route is the superior option.  But such analysis requires some 
means of measuring the quality of outcomes; where the only concretely 
quantifiable outcome is cost, the risk is that simply the cheapest option will be 
selected.
92
   
The goal of overcoming this significant hurdle to the full adoption of EBP 
fueled the launch of the Systems Evaluation Project (“SEP”) in 2005.93  The SEP 
represents the first dedicated effort to approximate the medical model of EBP in 
the indigent defense context by enumerating outcomes sought and developing a set 
of indicators to empirically measure achievement of those outcomes.
94
  After some 
seven years of research, consultation with stakeholders, and canvassing of the 
literature, the SEP produced an ambitious document and related materials outlining 
a process for evaluation that identifies overarching system goals (such as 
protecting the right to counsel and preventing conviction of the innocent), eleven 
concrete objectives of quality representation (such as pretrial release, protection of 
constitutional rights, and client satisfaction), twenty-six measures to determine the 
extent to which objectives are being met (consisting of various system inputs such 
as number of bond reduction motions or motions to suppress are filed), and a 
variety of measurable effects (such as cost savings resulting from reduction in jail 
populations or a decrease in public benefits payouts) to state in quantifiable terms 
the value of objectives being achieved.
95
  If successfully implemented, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
89  See, e.g., 2005 IDS REPORT, supra note 86, at 4; see also Gressens Interview, supra note 
82 (discussing legislative support for public defenders). 
90  See MARGARET A. GRESSENS & DARYL V. ATKINSON, THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING INDIGENT 
DEFENSE: NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEMS EVALUATION PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES GUIDE 1–2 (2012), 
available at http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/performancemeasures/PM_guide.pdf. 
91  See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing cost-effectiveness analysis). 
92  See Maher Interview, supra note 79. 
93  See Gressens Interview, supra note 82. 
94  See GRESSENS & ATKINSON, supra note 90, at 1–2. 
95  Id. at 4–7. 
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evaluation framework would facilitate analysis that would exceed current 
analytical capacity in a number of respects: The framework could objectively 
demonstrate that quality goals had been achieved by pointing to measurements; it 
could quantify the value of system goals being achieved; and it would enable 
predictions about effects on quality from altering particular inputs (such as 
increasing lawyer caseloads).   
The Project is now operationalizing the SEP evaluation framework in North 
Carolina and three additional jurisdictions in Connecticut, Tennessee, and Texas.
96
  
Development of these four pilot sites has in itself been a significant 
accomplishment by the SEP, as each test jurisdiction has begun to collect case-
level data using uniform and comparable units of measurement (such as uniform 
definitions of a “case” unit), generating a data set that includes millions of 
individual cases and data including a range of case outcomes, cost, length of time 
to accomplish initial attorney contact, pretrial outcomes, defendant demographics, 
and so forth.
97
  Thus, regardless of the success of the SEP evaluation framework, 
the piloting efforts represent a significant infusion of defense-related data. 
Aside from its work within North Carolina, the IDS Office has concertedly 
undertaken to facilitate the spread of EBP in the indigent defense community.  The 
stated goal of the SEP is to generate a replicable framework for EBP that could be 
adopted by any office or jurisdiction, and IDS Office staff has engaged in 
significant outreach to engage the indigent defense community with its mission.
98
  
Additionally, the IDS Office partnered with the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers to develop and obtain grant funding for the Justice Standards, 
Evaluation and Research Initiative (“JSERI”), to facilitate adoption of evidence-
based practices by indigent defense service providers themselves—independently 
from state oversight boards.
99
  Significantly, however, JSERI was a grant-funded 
effort for which funding has now concluded.  So too was the SEP formed (and 
“branded”) as an independent project of the IDS Office in part to attract grant 
funding for its efforts; little has been in the offing, however, which has contributed 
to the extremely protracted timeline of the project.
100
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%20Project/SEP%20HomePage.html?c=Research%20%20and%20%20Reports,%20Systems%20Eva
luation%20Project (last visited Nov. 30, 2014). 
99  About JSERI, NAT’L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS’N, http://www.nlada.net/jseri/about 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2015); NCIDS and the JSERI Project, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, 
http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/Projects/JSERI.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); 
NLADA & NCIDS, TOOLKIT FOR BUILDING IN-HOUSE RESEARCH CAPACITY (2013), available at 
http://www.nlada100years.org/sites/default/files/NLADA%20Toolkit%20-%20Research%20Capacity.pdf. 
100 Gressens Interview, supra note 82. 
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B. Texas 
 
By the year 2001, as the North Carolina IDS was getting off the ground, the 
state of indigent defense services in Texas had reached a boiling point.  Texas’s 
indigent defense “system,” such as it was, was nothing more than an agglomeration 
of practices that lay entirely in the discretion of each of the state’s 254 counties—
indeed, within the discretion of each of the more than 800 trial courts within those 
counties.
 101
  In the vast majority of courts, an assigned counsel mechanism was 
used to appoint lawyers, commonly with the judges before whom defense attorneys 
were practicing having sole and standardless discretion over which lawyers 
received appointments and what they would be paid.
102
  Moreover, localities had 
not only exclusive authority over the design of defense services, but also exclusive 
responsibility for the cost.  Perhaps predictably—given restricted local budgets as 
compared to the state, particularly in Texas’s many rural counties—Texas ranked 
near the very bottom of all states in total indigent defense expenditures.
103
  This 
was so despite its status as the second most populous state,
104
 and more 
disturbingly, despite its accompanying status as the leading practitioner of capital 
punishment.
105
  Perhaps equally predictably in light of this mixture of radical 
decentralization and chronic underfunding, Texas in the year 2000 was being 
lambasted (as its then-governor ran for president) as an exemplar of the nation’s 
indigent defense crisis.
106
  And yet, as even the state’s staunchest critics noted, 
allegations of systemic failure in Texas’s provision of counsel were largely 
anecdotal and speculative, given the complete absence of any mechanism of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
101 See Catherine Greene Burnett et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective Counsel: The 
Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 595, 600–01 (2001); TEXAS 
APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, THE FAIR DEFENSE REPORT: ANALYSIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PRACTICES IN 
TEXAS 22–23 (2000), available at http://www.texasappleseed.net/pdf/projects_fairDefense_fairref.pdf.  
102  Greene Burnett et al., supra note 101, at 610–12; TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, 
supra note 101, at 12. 
103  Greene Burnett et al., supra note 101, at 600–01; TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, 
supra note 101, at 14.  Of Texas’s 254 counties, only 77 are classified as metropolitan areas, leaving 
177 rural, and mostly shrinking, counties.  See Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Texas Forecast: 
Widely Scattered Growth, The TEXAS ECONOMY, http://www.thetexaseconomy.org/people-
places/population/articles/article.php?name=scattered_growth (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
104  See Annual Estimates of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid= 
PEP_2013_PEPANNRES&prodType=table. 
105  Richard C. Dieter, 1999 Year End Report: Executions Reach Record High, But Concern 
Also Grows, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/1999-year-end-
report-executions-reach-record-high-concern-also-grows (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (showing Texas 
as leading execution state in 1999). 
106  See, e.g., Kate Jones, Indigent Defense, CHAMPION, July 2001, at 33, 33; TEX. APPLESEED 
FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT , supra note 101 (summarizing Texas’s notorious status). 
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tracking or monitoring what occurred within the state’s hundreds of indigent 
defense micro-systems.
107
     
Against this backdrop, in 2001 the Texas legislature enacted the Texas Fair 
Defense Act.  The Act for the first time provided state funding to assist counties in 
covering the cost of indigent defense, and provided a mechanism for holding 
county indigent defense provision accountable to statewide standards relating to 
attorney qualification, caseloads, and other measures of quality.
108
  Of central 
significance in the legislative scheme was the creation of a statewide Task Force 
on Indigent Defense (later renamed the Texas Indigent Defense Commission, and 
referred to herein as “TIDC”).  The TIDC is accountable to a thirteen-member 
board that includes at least seven judicial members, and its full-time work is 
carried out by a ten-person professional staff (an increase from its initial five-
member staff).
109
  TIDC and its Board are administratively located within the 
Texas judiciary, under the auspices of the Office of Court Administration.
110
  The 
TIDC’s charge, broadly construed, is to implement and monitor compliance with 
the Fair Defense Act: developing standards for the provision and practice of 
defense services; monitoring county compliance with those standards; distributing 
state funds to counties and monitoring use of those funds; and a range of additional 
quality-enhancing functions.
111
  At the same time, however, the Fair Defense Act 
formally preserved significant county autonomy.  Individual counties retained the 
authority to select their own system for providing defense counsel, so long as that 
system was reported to TIDC in the form of county plans and otherwise met TIDC-
promulgated standards.
112
  Concomitantly, counties continued to shoulder a 
significant majority of indigent defense costs, with the state’s contributions 
amounting (in the most recent budget) to only approximately thirteen percent of 
total costs.
113
   
In contrast to North Carolina’s statutory commitment to evidence-based 
practice (including the mandate of developing statistical information and 
generating cost-effectiveness analyses), evidence-based practice is a more 
understated element of the TIDC’s legislative charge.  The TIDC was expressly 
charged with a variety of information-gathering and monitoring functions, but was 
largely left to determine for itself how and to what extent it would make use of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
107  See TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, supra note 101, at 3, 53. 
108  See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 79.034 & 79.037 (West 2013); Rodney Ellis & Hannah 
Liebman Dershowitz, Gideon’s Promise: The Texas Story, CHAMPION, Apr. 2003, at 61, 62. 
109  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§  79.002, 79.011, 79.013 & 79.014 (West 2013); TEXAS 
INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014 ii (2014), available at 
http://tidc.texas.gov/media/30757/fy14annual-report141229.pdf. 
110  See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 79.033 (West 2013). 
111  See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 79.034–.036 (West 2013); see also Green Burnett et al., 
supra note 101, at 666–67 (highlighting significance of centralized data collection). 
112  See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 79.035–.036 (West 2013). 
113  TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, ANNUAL AND EXPENDITURE REPORT 2013 10 (2014), 
available at http://tidc.texas.gov/media/18588/fy13annualreport.pdf. 
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data on indigent defense that would be generated by the counties.  Collection and 
reporting on total county expenditures were the only clear data-driven mandates of 
the Fair Defense Act, and standing alone this information is insufficiently detailed 
to make meaningful judgments about the quality or comparative benefits of various 
county approaches.
114
   
Nevertheless, the TIDC determined at the outset that it would aim to develop 
a research base and attempt to adopt evidence-based practices.  The TIDC’s first 
strategic plan, published three years into its existence, stated that one of the 
organization’s three core goals was using “evidence-based practices” to “promote 
local compliance and accountability with the requirements of the” Fair Defense 
Act.
115
  The TIDC described the hallmarks of its evidence-based approach as 
collection and analysis of data to measure compliance with the quality standards 
contained within the Fair Defense Act (such as prompt initial appearance and 
advisement of the right to counsel, timely appointment, and fair selection of 
attorneys from lists of qualified counsel),
116
 ongoing monitoring and evaluation of 
indigent defense services by the localities themselves, and evaluation of 
innovations undertaken by individual localities.
117
  Beginning the following year, 
the TIDC’s commitment to evidence-based practice would feature prominently in 
the Commission’s annual reports to the legislature, which highlight EBP as central 
to the TIDC’s work in empowering and supporting localities and achieving a cost-
effective indigent defense system.
118
  The Commission’s staff has now expanded to 
include two dedicated policy analysts whose job responsibilities expressly include 
development and deployment of evidence-based practices.
119
 
The TIDC’s choice to pursue and advertise its pursuit of EBP was prompted 
by a number of factors.  First, the key players in the formation of the TIDC were 
keenly aware of the North Carolina example and its innovation in evidence-based 
reform.  The TIDC’s first and still-serving executive director, a lawyer by training 
who at the time of his appointment in 2001 was a relative newcomer to criminal 
justice politics, relied substantially on the advice of colleagues with longer 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
114  See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 79.036(e) (West 2013).  An additional data collection 
requirement was added in the 2013 legislative session, mandating county reporting of the distribution 
of appointments among attorneys on assigned counsel lists.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 79.036(a-1) 
(West 2013). 
115  See TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPROVING TEXAS INDIGENT 
DEFENSE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 2005–2010  9 (2005). 
116  See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.04–.05 (West 2009). 
117   TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, supra note 115, at 9–12. 
118  See TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, TEXAS TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, 2006 ANNUAL 
REPORT AND EXPENDITURE REPORT 1 (Feb. 22, 2007), http://tidc.texas.gov/media/18593/fy06annualreport.pdf 
(highlighting and explicating EBP in cover letter). 
119  See Jamie Dickon (member profile), TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, 
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/commission/staff/jamie-dickson.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2015); Joel 
Lieurance (member profile), TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N,  http://www.tidc.texas.gov/ 
commission/staff/joel-lieurance.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
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experience in criminal defense and criminal justice oversight.
120
  TIDC personnel 
shaped the agency’s course based in part on advice from IDS Office personnel, 
including its first director, who was highly supportive of adopting evidence-based 
practices.  Other individuals guiding the early work of the TIDC in Texas were 
also evidence-based-practice evangelists, including members of the Texas 
Criminal Justice Policy Council (“CJPC”), a now-defunct state agency that had a 
dedicated mission to amass and analyze state criminal justice data in order to 
advise policymakers.
121
  CJPC staff, including in particular its director, encouraged 
the Commission to leverage its authority under the Fair Defense Act to gather and 
report fine-grained information about individual county indigent defense 
practices.
122
  Second, the practical challenges posed by overseeing 254 separate 
systems in Texas’s diverse counties forced the TIDC to think systematically about 
how it could carry out its monitoring functions; data, as well as instantiating 
continuous self-monitoring by localities, were critical pieces of that strategy.
123
  
Third, developing an evidence base for indigent defense policies and practices was 
viewed as politically critical to enable the TIDC to pursue its mission in a state 
with a long history of inadequate indigent defense funding and resistance to 
centralized oversight and decision-making.  The Commission would need hard 
numbers—“black and white” evidence,124 in Director Jim Bethke’s words—to 
persuade the state to continue to fund its work and counties to comply with the 
standards it was promulgating.  Persuading localities to opt into better practices of 
their own accord—on the strength of the data rather than at the insistence of the 
Commission—was particularly important for the TIDC to avoid the appearance of 
acting as a top-down vehicle for state control.  Hence, the Commission frequently 
and prominently touts EBP as a tool to enhance local control that “places the 
knowledge in the hands of those responsible for providing [defense] services” and 
“provide local and state officials solid information to make informed decisions 
about indigent defense practices.”125  
The TIDC’s steps toward EBP have been facilitated by several features of its 
structure and statutory mandate.  First, the TIDC’s data-gathering capacity is 
enhanced by its administrative attachment to the Office of Court Administration, 
which is the state clearinghouse for case-level data on system inputs and outcomes, 
and which pursuant to statutory mandate has provided the TIDC with access to its 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
120  See Interview with Jim Bethke, Executive Director, Texas Indigent Defense Commission 
(Sept. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Bethke Interview] (notes on file with author). 
121  See Scott Henson, Lawmakers Want to Revive TX Criminal Justice Policy Council, GRITS 
FOR BREAKFAST (Jun. 8, 2006, 9:03 P.M.), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2006/06/lawmakers-
want-to-revive-tx-criminal.html (discussing history of CJPC); Bethke Interview, supra note 120. 
122  See Bethke Interview, supra note 120. 
123  See id. 
124  See id. 
125  See TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, 2008 ANNUAL 
REPORT (2009), http://tidc.texas.gov/media/18591/fy08annualreport.pdf.  
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databases and their contents.
126
  Second and perhaps more critically, the TIDC’s 
opportunity to produce indigent defense evidence and to leverage that evidence 
with policymakers is enabled by its twin authority to distribute state funding via 
grants to counties and to monitor county performance after receipt of grant 
funds.
127
  Thus, the TIDC’s routine grant monitoring rules allow it to capture not 
only total county expenditures but also more discrete data such as the time that it 
takes to appoint counsel, the number and cost of authorizations for experts and 
investigators, and the identity of attorneys appointed (permitting assessment of 
whether appointments are evenly distributed on the list of available counsel).
128
  
Also crucial on this score was the TIDC’s decision to award a portion of the state-
funded grants on a competitive basis to counties proposing innovative indigent 
defense service programs, thereby propagating a number of pilot programs across 
the state.
129
  Such funds went, for example, to the establishment of several local 
and regional public defender offices, a county program to pilot a voucher-funded, 
client-selected attorney appointment system, and, as Stephen Schulhofer details in 
this issue, a first-of-its-kind client-choice program.
130
  Significantly, these grants 
were disbursed with express conditions providing for extensive data gathering and 
analysis by the Commission or its designees.
131
  The TIDC, typically aided by 
outside research partners and grant money, has in turn conducted a number of 
large-scale evaluations of these programs – studies which in turn have been 
important in encouraging other localities to innovate.  The TIDC’s 2012 study of 
the Wichita County Public Defender, for example, analyzed a multi-year data set 
and a range of records to compare case processing and outcomes in cases handled 
by private assigned counsel versus those handled by public defenders; among other 
conclusions, the study demonstrated that public defenders provided more services 
to clients and obtained more case dismissals at a lower per-case cost than private 
assigned counsel in comparable cases.
132
  The Wichita County Public Defender 
study, among others, has been instrumental in prompting other jurisdictions to 
replace judge-assigned counsel programs (maintained by the vast majority of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
126  See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 79.033 (West 2013); Office of Court Administration, TEX. 
JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.txcourts.gov/oca.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
127  See 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174.28 (2010). 
128  See Fiscal Monitor Checklist, TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, 
http://tidc.texas.gov/media/13441/140714FiscalMonitorchecklist.pdf; TEX. ADMIN. CODE §174.28(c) 
(2009). 
129  See Discretionary, TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, http://tidc.texas.gov/grants-
reporting/discretionary.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) (describing discretionary grant process); see 
also 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§173.101–.109 (2012) (describing monitoring authority). 
130  See Stephen Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and 
Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505 (2015). 
131  See, e.g., TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, ANNUAL AND EXPENDITURE REPORT 2012 4–5 
(2013) (describing Harris County grant and conditions). 
132  DOTTIE CARMICHAEL & MINER P. BARCHMANKS III, WICHITA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
OFFICE: AN EVALUATION OF CASE PROCESSING, CLIENT OUTCOMES, AND COSTS iii–iv (2012), 
available at http://tidc.texas.gov/media/18620/wichitapdostudy101212.pdf. 
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Texas’s counties) with public defender offices or other more independent methods 
of staffing indigent defense.
133
    
As the TIDC’s internal commitment to EBP has increased, external actors 
have begun to look to the agency as a source of evidence-based guidance, and have 
in turn enhanced the agency’s formal mandate to develop an indigent defense 
evidence base.  For example, in a response to concern that some defense attorneys 
carried unmanageable caseloads that compromised the quality of representation, 
the legislature in 2013 enacted a requirement that attorneys authorized to accept 
indigent defense appointments track and report to the TIDC all time spent on 
appointed cases.
134
  The bill further required that the TIDC conduct a study to 
establish an evidence-based caseload standard for indigent defense providers.
135
  
The study was completed and published at the start of 2015, and represents the first 
effort in Texas not only to document (within a sample of jurisdictions) actual 
attorney caseloads and time spent on discrete case tasks, but also to employ a 
rigorous empirical methodology to assess the amount of time that should be spent 
representing misdemeanor and felony clients.
136
  That study and the now-
continuous stream of county-level data about attorney time and caseloads has 
significant potential to influence future oversight and advocacy.  For example, in 
the most recent legislative session, a bill has been introduced to require judges, in 
appointing defense counsel, to ensure that the appointment will not cause the 
attorney to exceed a “maximum allowable caseload” prescribed by the county.137  
Counties will presumably be under significant pressure to follow the evidence-
based recommendations contained within the TIDC’s caseload study. 
Like North Carolina’s commission, the TIDC has also now moved into an 
EBP evangelist role.  The Commission’s executive director regularly gives 
presentations on TIDC’s evidence-based initiatives at bar conferences and other 
venues, and a number of TIDC authored or supported publications are aimed at 
creating “blueprint[s]” for evidence-based practices by individual government 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
133  See, e.g., Fix the System: Public Defender Office Needed for Justice, HOUSTON CHRON. (Mar. 20, 
2008), http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Fix-the-system-Public-defender-office-needed-for-
1771537.php (citing cost studies from other counties to urge formation of Harris County public defender); see 
also Publications, TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, http://tidc.texas.gov/resources/publications.aspx?ptype 
=1413 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
134  See H.B. 1318, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (Tex. 2013), An Act Relating to the Appointment 
of Counsel to Represent Certain Youths and Indigent Defendants [hereinafter H.B. 1318] 
135  Id., at § 8. 
136  See DOTTIE CARMICHAEL ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE CASELOADS: A 
REPORT TO THE TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, available at 
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/ 150122_weightedcl_final.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
137  See S.B. 260, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (Tex. 2015), An Act Relating to Caseloads for 
Attorneys who are Appointed to Represent Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/billtext/html/SB00260I.htm. 
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units or indigent defense entities.
138
  The TIDC’s web site is also an important EBP 
resource, providing public access to data collected from counties, studies 
conducted, and research plans for future studies.
139
  But the TIDC’s experience is 
also illustrative of some of the limits of evidence-based practice in shaping 
indigent policy to enhance the quality of system-wide representation.  The 
expansion of public defender offices as an alternative to the still-prevailing use of 
judge-assigned private counsel has been touted as one hallmark of the TIDC’s 
enhancement of indigent defense quality in the state.  Perhaps nowhere is the 
potential significance of this trend greater than in Harris County, which until 2010 
was the largest court system in the country without a public defender office.  In 
that year, Harris County used TIDC grant funding to open a public defender office 
and assigned a portion of the County’s non-capital cases to the office, over 
significant opposition from a number of judges, members of the private defense 
bar, and county officials.
140
  Critically, a TIDC-backed study of the office’s first 
three years of performance has not quelled that controversy.  The study 
demonstrated that the public defender achieved better outcomes than private 
assigned counsel by a number of measures, including a greater proportion of case 
dismissals and acquittals.
141
  But beneath that summary, the details were more 
muddy: Outcomes for a relatively small sample of clients with mental illness 
represented by public defenders were significantly better than those represented by 
appointed attorneys, but for non-mentally-ill defendants charged with felonies the 
comparative gains were slimmer.
142
  Moreover, the office operated at significantly 
higher per-case cost—$944 per felony, for example, as compared to $550 for 
appointed counsel.
143
  Supporters of the public defender model argue, of course, 
that the appointed counsel cost is too low, that it is suppressed by unsustainable 
caseloads, and that the quality improvements less susceptible of measurement 
justify greater spending.
144
  And this may be so.  But the data does not make that 
case in “black and white.”  There is evidence already that political pressure fueled 
by the cost data is leading judges—who still have discretion whether to appoint 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
138  See, e.g., Indigent Defense Data for Texas, TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, 
http://tidc.tamu.edu/public.net (last visited Nov. 30, 2014); Publications, TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE 
COMM’N, http://tidc.texas.gov/resources/publications.aspx?ptype=1413 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014). 
139  See, e.g., Indigent Defense Data for Texas, TEX. INDIGENT DEFENSE COMM’N, 
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141  See TONY FABELO ET AL., IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE: EVALUATION OF THE HARRIS 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 1–2 (2013), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ 
media/publications/Evaluation%20of%20Harris%20County%20TX%20Pub.%20Defender%20Justic
e%20Center%202013.pdf. 
142  See id. at 30–34. 
143  See id. at 16. 
144  See, e.g., id. at 17, 36–39. 
350 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 12:325 
 
counsel from the public defender office or a list of private attorneys—to opt not to 
use the office.
145
   
 
C. New York 
 
New York’s indigent defense system resembles Texas’s in the extent to which 
it remains, as it was designed when Gideon was decided fifty years ago, a county-
by-county pastiche of different service delivery mechanisms that largely lacks state 
funding or oversight.
146
  Experts in the last decade have frequently characterized 
the system as being in a state of “crisis,” with an array of study commissions 
echoing common areas of concern: attorneys in many of the state’s sixty-two 
counties—particularly those north of New York City—practicing without adequate 
compensation or resources and crushing caseloads, with no meaningful quality 
standards, and with insufficient independence from the appointing authorities.
147
  
The deleterious situation is widely understood to be aggravated by New York’s 
radically decentralized and byzantine court structure, by which more than a 
thousand village and town courts operate within upstate counties with near-total 
autonomy, adjudicating petty offenses and misdemeanors (and handling 
preliminary felony matters) under the authority of largely lay judges.
148
  Multiple 
lawsuits have been brought to challenge the system, including one that recently 
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146  See COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6–14 (2006) [hereinafter KAYE COMM’N], available at 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf  (detailing 
history of New York’s indigent defense system).  The 2014 settlement of long-standing litigation over the State’s 
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Legal Services (Oct. 22, 2014) [hereinafter, Statement of William J. Leahy], available at 
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147  See, e.g., Michael McConville & Chester Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York, 15 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 583 (1986–87); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE 
IN NEW YORK ii–vi, 2 (2006) [hereinafter SPANGENBERG N.Y. REPORT], available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf; KAYE COMM’N, supra 
note 146, at 7–9; JONATHAN LIPPMAN & JUANITA BING NEWTON, ASSIGNED COUNSEL COMPENSATION IN NEW 
YORK: A GROWING CRISIS (2000), available at http://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Assigned%20Counsel%20 
Compensation%20Crisis%20-%20NYS%20Unified%20Court%20System,%20January%202000.pdf 
(discussing compensation crisis).  
148  See SPANGENBERG N.Y. REPORT, supra note 147, at 103–20. 
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terminated in an historic settlement between plaintiffs and the State, Hurrell-
Harring v. State of New York.
149
    
And yet, despite these numerous efforts to assess the state of indigent defense 
in New York, another constant refrain from observers of the system was the 
difficulty of gaining a complete and accurate picture of that system due to the 
absence of systematic collection of indigent defense data at the local level, and the 
near absence of analysis or monitoring of data by any centralized authority.
150
  In 
2006, a task force commissioned by the then-chief judge of the New York Court of 
Appeals issued a report in which the central recommendation was the creation of a 
centralized statewide defender system consisting of regional and local trial and 
appellate public defender offices, as well as, critically, a statewide commission 
charged with standard setting, data gathering, performance monitoring, and 
additional oversight functions.
151
 
In 2010, the New York legislature responded to the increasingly pitched 
criticism with only a partial endorsement of the Kaye Commission’s 
recommendations.  Indigent defense reform legislation maintained the locality-by-
locality service provision approach, but did create a statewide oversight 
commission in the form of the New York State Office of Indigent Defense 
Services, an executive-branch agency overseen by a nine-member Indigent Legal 
Services Board and staffed initially with ten employees.
152
  The Office and the 
Board assumed responsibility for disbursing an already-extant state fund to assist 
localities with a portion of the cost of defense services, promulgating service 
provision standards, monitoring local compliance, and, critically, assembling and 
analyzing available evidence concerning indigent defense services and their 
outcomes.
153
   
On this last point, and far more than in Texas or North Carolina, the 
foundations of an evidence-based mission were built into the New York Office’s 
legislative design.  Its authorizing statute mandated that the Office collect and 
analyze an array of data regarding, for example, attorney qualifications and 
compensation, caseloads, local expenditures, and case dispositions, and for many 
categories mandated comparison with comparable figures on prosecution 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
149  See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8 (2010); New York Cnty. Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 294 
A.D.2d 69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).  Hurrell-Harring concluded after seven years of litigation with a settlement 
agreement signed on October 21, 2014.  See Hurrell-Harring Order of Settlement, supra note 146.  The settlement 
was pathbreaking both in the State of New York’s acceptance of financial responsibility—for the first time—for 
indigent defense in several of its counties, and for the lodging of responsibility for implementing the settlement in 
a dedicated indigent defense oversight entity.  See Statement of William J. Leahy, supra, note 146.  The latter 
point is discussed further at supra note 146, and infra notes 169, and 204, and accompanying text. 
150  See KAYE COMM’N, supra note 146, at 9, 26; SPANGENBERG N.Y. REPORT, supra note 147, 
at ii, 32–36. 
151  KAYE COMM’N, supra note 146, at 27–32. 
152  See N.Y. EXEC. L. §§ 832–833 (McKinney 2010). 
153  See N.Y. EXEC. L. § 832 (McKinney 2010). 
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services.
154
  Relatedly, the Office was directed to establish procedures whereby 
localities would self-report data “to assist the office in monitoring the quality of 
indigent legal services.”155  The statute also effectively directed that the Office’s 
quality recommendations be evidence-based, by mandating that the Office analyze 
collected data “to consider and recommend measures to enhance the provision of 
indigent legal services.”156  Appropriate to its data-driven mission, the Office’s 
initial staff complement includes a Director of Research position staffed by a 
trained social scientist.
157
  The Office has also begun to partner with outside 
research entities, including the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of 
New York at Albany.
158
 
On the other hand, while the New York commission’s formal commitment to 
data collection and evidence-based practice may be comparatively greater than its 
predecessors, there are early indications that its aspirations are hampered by 
structural deficiencies in the commission’s design and the state’s criminal justice 
data infrastructure.  Both commission staff and outside researchers report that it is 
still difficult to obtain comprehensive data even regarding aggregate features of 
indigent defense practice—funds expended, distribution of cases among particular 
service providers, and so forth—much less at the case-specific level.159  This 
appears partly due to the persistence of poor data coordination between New 
York’s Office of Court Administration and the countless county, village, and town 
courts that are under persistently unenforced mandates to report data, as well as 
limits on the OCA’s own data collection.160  Additionally, and in contrast to Texas 
and North Carolina, the New York Office has neither a formal nor informal link to 
the OCA to facilitate obtaining what data the agency does collect.
161
  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
154  See N.Y. EXEC. L. § 832(b) (McKinney 2010). 
155  See N.Y. EXEC. L. § 833(j) (McKinney 2010). 
156  See N.Y. EXEC. L. § 833(c) (McKinney 2010). 
157  See Andrew Davies, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, 
http://www.ils.ny.gov/node/20 (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
158  Research and Data Analysis, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, 
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/research-and-data-analysis (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
159  See e-mail from Andrew Davies to author (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Davies Email] (“Until you have data on every case involving every client, you don't have the ability 
to look at what makes a difference for those clients. So, notwithstanding the intent to base our 
defender system on data and evidence, it's a hollow (or limited) promise if there is no data 
infrastructure to back it up.”); Interview with Andrew Davies (Sept. 29, 2014) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Davies Interview]; Joel Stashenko, NYCLU Report on Public Defense Provides Fuel for 
Trial, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202670426093/NYCLU-
Report-on-Public-Defense-Provides-Fuel-for-Trial?slreturn=20140930133258 (noting “difficulty” in 
gathering data from various entities for purposes of Hurrell-Harring litigation). 
160  See SPANGENBERG N.Y. REPORT, supra note 147, at 32–36; see also Brief of the New York 
State Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hurrell-Harring v. State of 
New York, 2010 WL 1775138, at *3 n.2 (noting difficulty of assessing outcome of post-conviction 
motions because court system did not keep data on filings). 
161  See Davies Email, supra note 159; see also supra notes 70, 83, 108, 128 and accompanying 
text. 
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and again in contrast to Texas in particular, the New York Office’s implementing 
legislation did not include a data reporting requirement for counties, and the Office 
is not empowered (as the TIDC is) to withhold funding based on failure to report 
adequate data.
162
    
The New York Office is still in its infancy, however.  The pendency of the 
Hurrell-Harring litigation, which was initially dismissed but reinstated by the New 
York Court of Appeals shortly before the Office began operations, was a 
significant external factor affecting the Office’s first three years of work.163  
Multiple office staff members served as witnesses in the case, and the Office 
devoted significant resources to providing data to plaintiffs’ counsel. 164  More 
atmospherically, the existence of the suit and uncertainty about its outcome likely 
created a sense of collectively bated breath among indigent defense stakeholders 
and policymakers, and may have contributed to the persistence of revealed 
structural flaws in aspects of the Office’s mission.165  Nevertheless, even in its 
infancy the Office began to leverage its authority to fund competitive grants to 
expand its access to aggregate data on local indigent defense practices, building 
data-reporting requirements into the three requests for proposals it has issued since 
its formation.
166
  Over time these discretionary grants will permit greater data 
monitoring and some program analysis, and may prompt counties to begin to 
invest in necessary data-collecting technology.
167
  The Office has also conducted 
two studies to demonstrate what additional expenditures would be required for 
upstate counties to move into compliance with national caseload standards—albeit 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
162  Compare N.Y. Exec. L. § 833 (McKinney 2010), with Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 79.034–
.036 (West 2011). 
163  Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227–28 (N.Y. 2010). 
164  Stashenko, supra note 159, (describing prospective testimony by Bill Leahy); Davies 
Interview, supra note 159. 
165  Cf. Michael Whiteman, Another Voice: Cuomo Should Settle Class-Action Lawsuit On Public 
Defense, BUFFALO NEWS (Dec. 19, 2013, 11:17 PM), http://www.buffalonews.com/opinion/another-
voice/another-voice-cuomo-should-settle-class-action-lawsuit-on-public-defense-20131219 (stating that “the 
Office of Indigent Legal Services . . . lumbers along underfunded, understaffed, longing for executive fidelity and 
observing but glacial improvements,” and urging state takeover of system); UJAL SEHGAL, HELEN ZELON & 
LAUREN ALEXANDER, STATE OF INJUSTICE: HOW NEW YORK STATE TURNS ITS BACK ON THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 24 (2014), available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu_hh_report_FINAL.pdf (recommending that Office be transformed 
into statewide defender). 
166  See, e.g., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, FUNDING ANNOUNCEMENT: COUNSEL AT 
FIRST APPEARANCE DEMONSTRATION GRANT 9 (2012), available at 
https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/RFP%20For%20Counsel%20At%20First%20Appearance%20113012.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2014); N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, FUNDING ANNOUNCEMENT, UPSTATE 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND CASELOAD REDUCTION GRANT 11, available at 
https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/RFP%20For%20Upstate%20Quality%20Improvement%20and%20Caseload%20R
eduction%20082213.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2014). 
167  Davies Interview, supra note 159. 
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in reports that only highlighted the incredible difficulties still facing the Office in 
obtaining data to conduct this sort of basic system analysis.
168
 
In the aftermath of the Hurrell-Harring settlement, the Office is poised to 
emerge as a far more central player in indigent defense oversight, and is well-
positioned to leverage its evidence-based emphasis and expertise in data gathering 
and analysis.  The settlement agreement, to which the Office is a signatory, creates 
a binding legal obligation upon the Office to oversee achievement of many of the 
agreed-to benchmarks.  The Office will, in the coming months, be required to 
generate plans to ensure that in the five counties covered by the settlement: (1) all 
defendants are represented at arraignment, (2) caseload standards and 
recommendations concerning the resources necessary to comply with them are 
generated and continuously updated, and (3) a variety of additional quality 
initiatives are undertaken.
169
  Significantly, the settlement also obligates the State 
to augment the Office’s budget to add the staff and other resources necessary to 
take on these functions.
170
   
The Office’s first foray into developing a true evidence base to evaluate 
indigent defense practices is still on the horizon, but has recently been kick-started 
by an NIJ research grant.  A significant focus of the Office’s programmatic 
funding to date has been to ensure that indigent defendants in New York are 
represented at their initial appearance before a judge—a goal that has been far 
from being realized, especially in upstate counties.
171
  The Office piloted an 
evaluation of the impact of two counsel-at-first-appearance programs, in a study 
for which the data gathering alone required eight weeks of hand-searching court 
records.  That study will now be expanded with the assistance of federal funds 
through a recently awarded NIJ grant to evaluate the impact of assigning counsel at 
initial appearances in six counties.  Significantly, the prospective study will be 
among the first in the indigent defense literature to evaluate the process and effect 
of providing counsel in the context of non-urban counties.
172
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
168  N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, AN ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH MAXIMUM NATIONAL CASELOAD LIMITS IN UPSTATE NEW YORK 8–10 (2013) 
(discussing absence of data on case assignments or failure to separate case assignments by type in 
numerous counties despite legislative reporting mandate), available at 
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%20Nov%202013.pdf. 
169  Hurrell-Harring Order of Settlement, supra note 146, at 5, 7, 9–10, available at 
https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Hurrell-Harring%20Final%20Settlement%20102114.pdf. 
170  Id. at 15–16. 
171  See Counsel at First Appearance, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, 
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/counsel-first-appearance (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
172  See NIJ Award Detail: Early Intervention by Counsel: A Multi-Site Evaluation of the 
Presence of Counsel at a Defendant’s First Appearance in Court, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
http://www.nij.gov/funding/awards/pages/award-detail.aspx?award=2014-IJ-CX-0027 (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015). 
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III. TAKING STOCK 
 
Notwithstanding concerted efforts in North Carolina, Texas, and New York, 
and more episodic efforts elsewhere,
173
 indigent defense remains decidedly not 
evidence-based.  At best, recent years have seen an increase in data that permits 
gross description and comparison among pockets of the system; a limited number 
of studies in a small number of areas that can provide empirical evaluation of 
program effectiveness; and on the horizon a proposed but yet untested framework 
for making data-driven predictions about cause and effect, inputs, and ultimate 
quality in the practice and administration of indigent defense.  To be sure, these 
important developments allow policymakers’ and administrators’ decisions about 
provision of indigent defense to be better informed.  But they do not an evidence 
base make.  Perhaps more critically from the standpoint of benchmarking the 
development of EBP in the field, indications that the evidence on offer is actually 
influencing the development of indigent defense policy—that the “practice” is 
evidence-based—are relatively few and far between.174 
But if EBP remains a promissory notion in the indigent defense field, the 
previous Part demonstrates that it nevertheless has growing ranks of devotees, is 
garnering at least nominal attention from important funding sources, and appears 
increasingly to be attracting the interest of policymakers designing systems of 
indigent defense service provision.  None of this is without cost, of course.  Time 
and energy spent leaning on public defenders to gather better data might trade off 
with time and energy for skills training.  Grant funding for program evaluation 
might trade off with funding to alleviate caseloads or hire defense investigators.  
Staffing an oversight agency with researchers might trade off with dedicated grant-
monitoring personnel.  In a world of desperately limited resources for indigent 
defense, it is well to ask what we are getting, or are likely to get, from investment 
in developing the field’s evidence base.  Accordingly, this final Part critically 
assesses three aspects of EBP’s potential in the field: its potential to generate 
qualitatively better practices, its potential to grease the political wheels for indigent 
defense funding and policymaking, and its potential contributions to litigation-
centered strategies.  The analysis echoes some of the assessments of EBP in the 
criminal justice system generally that Part I enumerated, but demonstrates that the 
indigent defense context raises a distinctive array of potential benefits and pitfalls.  
Finally, the analysis closes with some cautionary thoughts on EBP’s tension with 
the constitutional precommitments that Gideon embodies.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
173  See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER 
SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS (2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_miss
ouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
174  See supra notes 86, 127, and 128 and accompanying text (describing limited evidence that 
Texas counties have responded to public defender studies conducted by the TIDC, and anecdotal 
accounts of the influence of North Carolina IDS Office’s work on the legislature).   
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A. EBP and Quality Practices 
 
First, there is the perhaps too-obvious prospect that EBP will reveal the details 
of what makes up a high quality system of indigent defense—what level of 
caseloads are truly sustainable, what types of tasks by defenders yield positive 
outcomes, what system of staffing indigent defense needs is optimal, and so forth.  
Such information would be valuable to legislators fashioning state-wide indigent 
defense structures or making budgetary decisions, as well as (perhaps more likely) 
to agency-level actors making fashioning policy within individual indigent defense 
organizations.  This is the promise held out by North Carolina’s System Evaluation 
Project, in its ambition to marshal sufficient data within and across jurisdictions 
and to develop an evaluation framework of sufficient detail and nuance to yield 
data that permits measurement of whether desired outcomes are being achieved.  It 
is the difference between knowing that jurisdiction X is maintaining 400 felony 
cases per attorney while jurisdiction Y maintains 300—knowledge that reveals 
little but even still is currently in low supply—and knowing that in jurisdiction X 
with caseloads of 400 felonies there are fewer pretrial releases, fewer hours spent 
on investigation, fewer meetings with clients, and fewer motions filed than in 
jurisdiction Y.   
Achievement of this goal would indeed be groundbreaking, not only in the 
indigent defense field but in criminal justice policymaking generally.  To date, the 
substantive performance standards that guide defense practice are largely the 
product of professional experience and, ultimately, guesswork about how inputs 
relate to outputs.
175
  This is largely true even of some of the most ambitious efforts 
to date toward EBP in standard-setting, such as the Texas weighted caseload study 
discussed in Part II.  The key prescriptive component of that report, outlining what 
quantity of time should be allotted to case tasks (and, derived from that, what 
maximum caseload is compatible with quality representation), is ultimately derived 
from the subjective views of practitioners and experts.
176
  To be sure, those views 
were elicited and developed in a structured and systematic manner, consistent with 
research design borrowed from other fields.
177
  But ultimately this is not the sort of 
data-driven judgment about cause and effect that drives EBP’s proponents’ 
predicted linkage between empirical success and future quality.  
Moreover, standard-setting in indigent defense almost universally continues to 
beg the question of precisely what good defense practice is aiming to achieve.
178
  
Acquittals?  Best sentencing outcomes?  A performative bulwark against state 
power?  Achieving evidence-based indigent defense would permit policymakers 
and practitioners to select practices or systems of service provision with 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
175  See supra notes 54–57. 
176  See Carmichael et al., supra note 136, at 7–8. 
177  Id. 
178  See supra note 54. 
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significantly higher confidence than we (should) have now about what outcomes 
will flow from those decisions.  Particularly against a backdrop of always limited 
resources, evidence-based evaluations of indigent defense practices and programs 
permit advocates, lawmakers, and agency leaders to identify the highest quality 
investment, and to know what consequences for quality might flow from increased 
or diminished expenditures.  Less concretely but no less importantly, the attention 
that evidence-based practice requires to rigorously identifying the outcomes that 
are sought for system actors offers the promise of both solidifying professional 
self-understanding, and also rendering that self-understanding transparent to 
clients, lawmakers, and taxpayers.  Indeed, especially in light of Gideon’s 
democratic underpinnings,
179
 the prospect of a more broadly understood and 
accountable indigent defense system is a valuable, if frequently overlooked, goal in 
itself.
180
   
But there are significant barriers to achieving evidence-based practice at the 
above-described level of sophistication.  The most formidable among them may be 
the most obvious: resources.  The North Carolina IDS managed to develop an 
evaluation framework only after some eight years of work by its research staff.  
They did so under the auspices of an agency with a dedicated data-development 
mission, dedicated staff to carry out that mission, and EBP devotees at its helm—
unusual features as compared to the national landscape.  Even with those 
advantages, the IDS staff report that they have been continuously on the hunt for 
additional outside grant funding to add research personnel.  Only one such grant 
has been in the offing (an Open Society Foundation grant that recently ended), a 
low success rate that IDS staff attribute to the slim availability of funding for 
government agencies as opposed to non-profit entities.
181
  To be sure, the 
evaluation framework developed by the SEP can now be piloted in jurisdictions 
across the country; the start-up costs for that effort are largely complete.  But the 
task of developing a robust and trustworthy evidence base for indigent defense 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
179  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged with crime 
to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in 
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180  Cf. Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. 
REV. 543, 558 (2014) (urging enhancement of transparency and other democratic values in the 
criminal justice system). 
181  See Maher Interview, supra note 79; Gressens Interview, supra note 82. 
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cannot hinge on the efforts, however rigorous, of a single team of researchers.  The 
SEP’s framework must now be not only implemented, but also critiqued and 
revised; competing frameworks should perhaps be developed.  Moreover, 
implementing the framework of evaluation requires far more than simply flipping a 
switch on a computer.  In any jurisdiction, a multitude of data must be collected 
from multiple criminal justice agencies, sorted, rendered comparable, and 
analyzed—tasks that typically require weeks of single-minded effort from multi-
person research teams.
182
   
Given these conditions, it is unlikely that EBP’s full flowering can occur 
through the sole or primary efforts of already stretched oversight agencies or other 
entities within the world of indigent defense practice.  What might be most needed 
for evidence-based indigent defense practice to flourish, therefore, is a significant 
uptick in attention to the phenomenon from the academic research community.  
Academic researchers can contribute comparatively greater time to push forward 
with the development of the evidence base, and have comparatively greater access 
to grants and other funding mechanisms.   
Importantly, researchers from outside the agencies that have been advancing 
the cause to date also might bring a needed additional aura of objectivity to the 
task.  Unquestionably, the state commissions that have been on the forefront of 
EBP have sought to be honest brokers in their production and analysis of data, and 
their leadership universally understands that the credibility of the data they present 
hinges on their efforts being perceived as disinterested and not advocacy-based.
183
  
And there is arguably no conflict between an oversight mission to ensure the 
provision of high quality indigent defense, and a research portfolio held out as 
providing evidence-based content to that vision.  But there might nevertheless be a 
perception among lawmakers that, given a defendant-protective charge, 
commission researchers might not be fully inclined to go wherever the evidence 
leads them.  Moreover, to the extent that a portion of the state commissions’ 
research stems from programs that they had a hand in developing and funding, 
there is indeed a diminished capacity for truly disinterested analysis.  Conversely, 
the imperative of preserving the appearance of objectivity for purposes of their 
research agendas might create pressure on commissions to forego taking 
contestable positions in other areas of oversight—encouraging, for example, 
conservative stances on evaluating local compliance with standards.  For these 
reasons, it will be a boon to the development of EBP for academic researchers to 
begin to pick up the slack from state commissions.
184
   
                                                                                                                                                   
 
182  See Davies Interview, supra note 159 (describing a small scale example of such effort in 
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Interview, supra note 120. 
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To the extent government agencies like the North Carolina, Texas, and New 
York commissions will continue to spearhead data-gathering and analysis, there 
are structural issues to attend to in their design.  These entities must be empowered 
to generate new data—by, for example, having the ability to force other system 
actors to track and report activities—and readily access what information might 
already exist in non-centralized form.  Of the three commissions discussed in Part 
II, the North Carolina IDS is perhaps best-positioned on this score; it enjoys both 
ready access to information already gathered by the Administrative Office of 
Courts, as well as the ability to gather data directly from two segments of state 
indigent defense providers—capital and appellate counsel—over which it has 
supervisory authority.  The New York Office, by contrast, was saddled with the 
most robust data collection mandate and the most comparatively feeble 
infrastructure to execute it.  The example demonstrates that lawmakers must attend 
to issues of broader system interconnectedness (or disconnectedness) when aiming 
for data-driven indigent defense practice.  Texas, for its part, may best exemplify 
an iterative process of a commission fueling policymakers’ demand for an 
information base, which in turn leads to greater structural empowerment of the 
oversight agency to collect, analyze, and drive decision-making with further 
evidence.
185
 
Also critical to the development of EBP will be continuing to develop the data 
infrastructure of indigent defense providers, as well as court systems and other 
criminal justice agencies in possession of relevant data about the progression of 
criminal cases.  These individual agencies need the capacity to efficiently gather 
and analyze discrete activities and outcomes in criminal cases, through automated 
case management software, automated time tracking, and other technological 
solutions that are common place in the private sector and still rare among criminal 
justice agencies.
186
  They also need the ability to share and coordinate data, a 
condition that is critical to make information susceptible to analysis, but that is 
frequently thwarted by incompatible data systems.
187
  The development of 
technological capacity has been a priority that has received significant federal 
grant money in other criminal justice sectors—law enforcement in particular.188  
The NIJ and the BJA should similarly prioritize this incremental but critical goal in 
the indigent defense context.   
Equal in importance to an infusion of resources for data collection, however, 
is an infusion of enthusiasm for it within the indigent defense community itself.  
Leaders in North Carolina, Texas, and New York all observed in interviews that 
                                                                                                                                                   
agency.  However there is a real question, the answer to which is well beyond the scope of this 
discussion, whether that administrative gain would be worth the bureaucratic candle.   
185  See supra notes 140–44. 
186  See Wright, supra note 26, at 92–93. 
187  Id. at 93. 
188  See Law Enforcement Equipment and Technology, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/technology/Pages/welcome.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 
2015). 
360 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 12:325 
 
resistance to information gathering and analysis from indigent defense providers, 
both individual and institutional, had to various extents created barriers to their 
work.
189
  They discussed the need to overcome the defense bar’s concern that 
evidence-based practice meant that attorneys would be negatively judged for 
adverse outcomes in individual cases—an outcome that frequently even the best 
representation cannot avoid.  Professional opposition to data collection might also 
flow simply from what is widely understood to be an autonomous, maverick 
culture to criminal defense, one in which tracking hours spent and tasks performed 
is likely to be met with resistance.
190
  There are indications that defense lawyers 
are beginning to embrace the data paradigm, but change remains spotty.
191
  Just as 
EBP has benefitted from thought leaders, it will likely take concerted leadership 
within the defense community to continue to shift the culture in the direction of 
data-driven, or at least data-producing, practice.     
Finally, a cautionary note is in order.  One might respond to the above 
enumeration of EBP’s barriers to implementation by suggesting that any 
incremental effort still constitutes progress.  To some extent that is true, as 
elucidation of more information about what transpires in the course of providing 
indigent defense services seems likely to be all for the best.  But the same might 
not confidently be said for incremental efforts at evidence-based evaluation.  The 
concern is that research might converge on studying correlations between system 
inputs and those outputs that are most readily trackable and, as a matter of data, 
obtainable: acquittals versus convictions, or perhaps sentencing outcomes, or 
perhaps any of these outputs vis-à-vis aggregated offense categories—felonies 
versus misdemeanors—rather than specific offenses.  The research to date, 
however, has indicated that these ultimate outcomes might evince little variation 
even among types of lawyers and lawyering for which there is reason to suspect 
qualitative difference.   
The Harris County Public Defender study is exemplary in this regard.  As Part 
II.B discussed, the study demonstrated only fairly slight outcome differences 
between public defenders and assigned counsel when looking at outcomes for 
aggregated case categories—a finding of particular concern to policymakers given 
the comparatively dramatic difference in price between the two system options.
192
  
But given documented differences in the quality of inputs, such as greater 
investigative resources and attention to client contact by public defenders, one 
might suspect that more fine-grained analysis might have yielded better results for 
the public defender.  A recent study of the Philadelphia Public Defender bears out 
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this intuition.  Analyzing specific offenses as well as aggregate categories, the 
study found that assigned counsel and the public defenders performed comparably 
for felonies generally, but isolated a dramatic difference in outcomes—nineteen 
percent more acquittals, sixty-two percent fewer life sentences—looking only at 
murders.
193
  The risk is that a flowering of studies that are insufficiently granular 
might have the perverse effect of failing to validate indigent defense programs that 
are indeed worthy of support.  Researchers must be mindful of these potential 
limitations, and advocates who will marshal the research must strategize about how 
to educate decision makers about gaps in the research that might deceptively 
validate a suboptimal status quo. 
 
B. EBP and the Political Landscape 
 
There is a second possible route to improved quality that EBP might open up, 
namely the prospect that arming defense advocates with evidence will grease the 
wheels of political support for better funding or other indicia of support for the 
system.  Leaders in the push for EBP have themselves touted this advantage in a 
number of forms.  Better data alone, it is argued, assists defender agencies in 
obtaining funding or other legislative dispensations, because it allows them to 
compete favorably with other budgetary causes that are able to show what 
legislators are buying with their money—X many roads, Y many hospital beds, Z 
many police cars, and so forth—and provides legislators with a greater sense of 
financial accountability.
194
  Beyond mere data, empirical evaluation of services and 
programs—such as the public defender studies conducted in Texas, or the to-be-
implemented SEP evaluation framework—will provide objective indicators of 
“what works” in indigent defense, which will be persuasive to decision makers 
who might otherwise be skeptical of programmatic claims that appear to emanate 
from the defense bar or other vested interests.
195
  A closely related argument 
predicting political leverage from EBP contends that research will demonstrate that 
at least some indigent defense investments enable downsizing of the criminal 
justice system—by, for example, obtaining dismissals of weak cases or release of 
low-flight-risk offenders through early representation and investigation—and that 
such programs will garner broad based support—among lawmakers and voters—as 
“smart” government-shrinking tactics.196  Relatedly, there is the possibility that the 
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sheer increase in transparency achieved by data would make indigent defense a 
more attractive site for public buy-in, thus building a voting constituency in a field 
that traditionally lacks one.  
Indeed, the point that evidence is more likely than anecdote to influence 
decision makers is a critical one, because its validity is, to some extent, a necessary 
condition for EBP’s success.  That is to say, simply developing an evidence base 
does not evidence-based practice make: Decision makers must utilize rather than 
ignore the evidence, and must use it well, to achieve the aims of the paradigm.
197
   
Here again, one may sensibly take the position that more information is better 
than less, that greater transparency about the operation and quality of defense 
services can at a minimum do no harm and surely has some marginal positive 
effect on the willingness of political actors to buy into the cause.  Indeed, it may be 
that the particular oversight structures exemplified by North Carolina, Texas, and 
New York present one of the strongest cases for this argument.  In all three states 
(and especially in Texas and New York), the indigent defense oversight agency has 
only very limited direct authority to direct particular improvements in the quality 
of defense services provided at the local level.  In Texas and New York, the 
enforcement mechanism that is built into the commission’s design is perverse at 
best: Counties that fail to comply with minimal state and commission standards in 
Texas, or that do not in the New York Office’s view merit state funding, may be 
deprived of funds—a decision that is almost guaranteed to lead to worse outcomes 
for indigent defendants, at least in the short term, than simply tolerating sub-
optimal local practices.  Where a state has chosen a relatively weak oversight 
entity, arming that agency with a robust data-gathering and analysis mission 
provides a critical tool in the basket of persuasion: Data collection and monitoring 
mandates mean that at a minimum localities risk the time and interference of 
commission involvement in their operations if they do not transparently comply 
with existing standards; localities may be dissuaded from intransigence by the 
prospect of public reporting of data such as appointment rates or caseloads; and 
local actors might be affirmatively persuaded to innovate based on evidence 
demonstrating that other localities had done so successfully. 
But there is cause for skepticism about the magnitude of political leverage to 
be gained from EBP.  First, my own armchair judgment is that the political 
dynamics of criminal justice will for the foreseeable future be driven by appeals to 
public safety, crime fighting, victim protection, and other interests—however 
laudable—that are not viewed as vindicated by support for indigent defense 
funding.  Defense services will always be competing for state dollars against 
entities that serve those interests far more straightforwardly.  And the interest 
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group base for indigent defense services is relatively small and even more 
politically disenfranchised.  It is difficult to imagine that data alone could move 
politicians off this cultural baseline—at least in the absence of crisis conditions, 
threats of legal liability, or other circumstances that are exogenous to the force of 
evidence per se.  
More concretely, I suspect that it will be rare case that providing quality 
indigent defense will on balance save money—which is probably the most 
potentially effective lever for attracting support and reframing indigent defense 
funding in a more politically saleable light.
198
  To be sure, a number of empirical 
studies to date have documented a range of cost savings generated by providing 
legal representation at bail hearings, including reduced jail populations by 
obtaining favorable bail decisions, and reduced prison populations by better 
sentencing outcomes for defendants bailed before trial.
199
  This is a particularly 
salient research finding, as those cost savings will tend to inure to the localities that 
run jails and often are shouldering the cost of indigent defense.  Not 
coincidentally, proposals for accelerating appointment of counsel and other ideas 
attending to pretrial representation have garnered the support of the emerging 
criminal justice coalitions that unite progressive reformers with fiscal and small-
government conservatives.
200
  But in general, the job of a defense lawyer—at least 
as we conceive of it today—is not to make the system more efficient.  A defense 
lawyer doing her job will take time and resources to pursue available investigative 
avenues, to attempt to suppress evidence, to make all available arguments in 
appellate and post-conviction proceedings, and more.  Our adversarial system 
simply does not assign an efficiency-generating task to defense lawyers.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, at least some efforts to wield evidence-based attorney 
caseload standards in order to increase funding of indigent defense to levels that 
better assure proper case staffing have met unmoving resistance.
201
 
Indeed, there are political risks if indigent defense advocates over-promise the 
ability of EBP to uncover a linkage between quality and cost savings.  The fate of 
the Harris County Public Defender study, described above, is illustrative.  Debate 
about the desirability of such an office centered significantly on cost, and more 
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specifically on the promise of replicating findings in other Texas counties where 
public defenders generated cost savings over alternative systems of service 
delivery.
202
  To be sure, the TDIC itself has been careful to embrace the mantel of 
cost effectiveness, a term of art understood in the regulatory literature to mean that 
programmatic goals or values are taken as fixed (rather than monetized), and an 
analysis is undertaken to determine the least costly means of realizing those 
goals.
203
  Cheapness was never on offer, it might be urged; only proposals as to the 
most economical route to a given level of quality.  But, again, the Harris County 
example shows the risk that policymakers will fail to appreciate the rather nuanced 
distinction between cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis, will understand a 
promise of cost-effectiveness as a promise of sheer cheapness, and will revolt 
when the latter offer is not fulfilled.
204
  It also shows that there may be downsides 
to offering a less-than-fully-developed evidence base for indigent defense 
programs.  Authors of the Harris County report argued that public defenders were 
achieving important objectives that either could not be counted or could not be 
monetized.  Of course, there are ways of quantifying an array of benefits that 
defense advocacy achieves, and indeed that is precisely the goal of an endeavor 
like North Carolina’s SEP.  But fully realizing the promise of the SEP framework 
is long in coming.  Moreover, while the SEP methodology is quantitative, the 
framework contains a host of normative qualitative judgments that are unlikely to 
be uncontroversial in application.  In evaluating the contributions of a public 
defender office, for example, how should one weight the lawyers’ varying 
achievements in obtaining pretrial release, filing and litigating suppression 
motions, obtaining acquittals, or generating client satisfaction?  Evidence-based 
measurement of indigent defense quality, even at its most nuanced, is unlikely ever 
to be as “black and white” as might be hoped.  In the meantime, bare assertions 
about qualitative value alongside objective cost data are unlikely to persuade the 
skeptical lawmakers who are the targets of EBP’s purported political grease; and 
indeed it might prospectively diminish lawmakers’ perception that program 
evaluations are being conducted in an objective, data-driven manner. 
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C. EBP in the Courts 
 
Finally, it is worth considering what impact a stronger evidence base for 
indigent defense might have in the courts.  These considerations bring us squarely 
back to Gideon itself, to ask what direct synergy there might be between EBP and 
the legal framework that governs claims by the indigent to counsel.   
Such legal claims are litigated, grossly, in two forms: post-conviction claims 
brought by individual defendants alleging the absence of inadequacy of counsel in 
their individual cases;
205
 and pre-conviction claims alleging denial of the right to 
counsel based on systemic conditions that presently or prospectively preclude 
constitutionally adequate representation.
206
  Relatedly, courts have increasingly 
entertained suits brought not by clients but by lawyers themselves, asserting 
federal constitutional rights or state law protections to oppose appointment without 
adequate compensation, under excessive caseload conditions, or in the face of 
other circumstances deleterious to the quality of services.
207
  In the instance of 
post-conviction litigation, defendants’ claims typically fall under the ineffective 
assistance framework announced in Strickland v. Washington, requiring claimants 
to demonstrate both that an attorney’s performance “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness,” and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
attorney’s errors affected the result of the proceeding.208  Prospective litigation by 
clients may sound in a claim of ineffective assistance, or a claim that counsel is 
being outright denied, but in either instance litigants will typically need to 
demonstrate the existence of system-wide deficiencies that are likely to preclude 
adequate representation in their cases.
209
  Theories of claims brought by lawyers 
themselves vary more widely, but typically share with prospective actions by 
clients a claim that a particular systemic condition—such as pay rates or 
caseloads—is legally deficient.210 
The potential for enhanced indigent defense data to buttress litigation-based 
efforts to vindicate Gideon has been touted by commenters, who have generally 
assumed a positive relationship between the elucidation of more evidence about 
indigent defense provision and the prospects for litigants challenging suboptimal 
representation in the courts.
211
  The recently resolved Hurrell-Harring litigation in 
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New York points to another positive but less-noted synergy between EBP and 
systemic litigation, one that arises in the context of remediation rather than claim 
development.  The strength of the settlement agreement as a vehicle for truly 
enhancing the quality of representation in New York is arguably greatly enhanced 
by the existence of the Office of Indigent Legal Services and, critically, by its 
capacity to gather, generate, and analyze indigent defense data.  Mandates to, for 
example, develop caseload standards and guidance about the resources needed for 
counties to comply with them, and to issue a range of other quality-related 
recommendations,
212
 will be carried out by an agency that is professionally 
inclined and quantitatively equipped to provide research-based answers to these 
questions.  In other words, development of an infrastructure for evidence-based 
analysis means that system actors are poised to rise to the occasion when 
significant reform opportunities arise. 
But indigent defense advocates pondering the influence of EBP in Sixth 
Amendment litigation might have cause for caution as well as enthusiasm.  This 
tempered view hinges in large part on distinguishing between the provision of 
sheer data, as opposed to research purporting to demonstrate linkages between 
particular system features and indigent defense outcomes.   
Consider first prospective litigation.  An exemplary case is the recently 
decided Wilbur v. Mount Vernon, in which a federal district court granted 
injunctive relief to cure Sixth Amendment violations endemic to two Washington 
cities’ provision of indigent defense.213  The evidence that plaintiffs amassed in 
support of their claim that the two cities routinely and systemically failed to 
provide constitutionally adequate counsel included both qualitative depictions of 
attorneys’ failure to meet with clients, investigate cases, and meaningfully explore 
defensive theories, as well as data revealing that attorneys labored under 
dramatically excessive caseloads.
214
  The ability to gather and compare caseload 
statistics was particularly critical, given that the State of Washington had itself 
legislated a 400-case limit, which the lawyers at issue substantially exceeded.
215
  
Recent history provides several counterpoints to the Wilbur success, in litigation 
that has floundered on the failure of the plaintiffs to adduce adequate empirical 
data to substantiate anecdotal claims of substandard representation.
216
  The case 
seems clear that the production of data will inure to the benefit of potential litigants 
in jurisdictions where deficiencies exist.  At a minimum, it can do no harm.  
But is the same true for the type of research that EBP aims to generate?  The 
answer must be that if we take seriously the prospect of following where the 
evidence leads, we simply do not know.  Consider the caseload issue that was 
central to the plaintiffs’ victory in Wilbur.  Sophisticated empirical research into 
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the significance of caseloads for attorney performance is just now beginning in 
earnest.
217
  The research findings might confirm existing standards, but they might 
well contradict them—indeed, they might even reveal that there are negligible 
performance differences, at least by certain outcome measures, for higher 
caseloads than are currently recommended.  Of course, if such a finding meant 
clearly that the quality of representation was adequate then there would be no 
warrant for litigation, no need to reform a functional system.  But the evidence 
might not mean that.  What if, for example, X level of caseloads correlated with 
identical acquittal rates but lower pretrial release statistics, or worse acquittal rates 
but better sentencing outcomes, or . . . the list could go on.  The point is that 
adducing evidence along the lines of what EBP’s true devotees aim to produce 
would at a minimum muddy the waters in any context where advocates aim to 
demonstrate that system features are related to unconstitutional conditions.  
An indigent defense evidence base might generate similarly mixed outcomes 
for retrospective ineffective assistance claims under the Strickland framework.  In 
assessing the objective reasonableness of an attorney’s performance, courts 
frequently use existing professional standards as non-binding benchmarks.
218
  
Indigent defense research has the clear potential not only to validate those 
standards, but also potentially to contradict them.  Producing a body of research 
that presents a more complicated picture than the current consensus might have the 
undesirable effect of making the deficiency prong more difficult to prove.  One 
could equally well imagine that research could either ease or complicate efforts to 
demonstrate prejudice from an attorney’s services if, for example, more robust 
evidence of the impact of various inputs on outcomes were adduced.     
 
D. Empirics at the Heart of Gideon 
 
In a sense, the foregoing simply dances around a more fundamental question 
about what the relationship should be between empirical findings and 
constitutional doctrine in this arena, questions that drive at the very meaning of 
Gideon.  Indeed, at the heart of the Gideon decision and the line of doctrine it 
generated is a raft of relatively untested empirical assumptions, including, 
critically, that counsel improves the lot of felony and misdemeanor defendants, 
both at trial and in negotiated resolutions.
219
  Now consider a hypothetical but 
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plausible study demonstrating that appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases 
had no positive effect on sentences or conviction rates as compared to defendants 
who proceeded without counsel.
220
  Should that finding prompt reconsideration of 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, extending the right to counsel to misdemeanors?
221
    
The answer must depend in part on what one thinks the Sixth Amendment 
protects.  For those on the Court who view the Sixth Amendment as protecting 
solely the right to a reliable outcome at trial—and there are some222—it is not 
implausible to imagine such a study persuading a revisiting of settled precedent.  
Indeed, a vision for contracting Gideon enjoys some academic support as well, 
from those who argue that restricting counsel for at least some misdemeanors is a 
sensible response to systemic resource constraints.
223
  If on the other hand the right 
to counsel is at least in part protecting less outcome-driven values like equal status 
before the law, or more public goods like confidence in the adversary system or 
projecting the outward appearance of equal status, a study like the one imagined is 
of less clear relevance in shaping doctrine.  The point for present purposes is not to 
settle the question of whether Argersinger should perdure, but rather to 
demonstrate that the research enterprise is open-ended, and that if advocates are to 
embrace empirics, they must also face down the possibility of retrenchment from 
Gideon’s current contours.  And if they are to do that, they must take care not to 
yield Gideon’s non-outcome-driven values in the course of embracing the EBP 
paradigm. 
Moreover, even if Gideon and its progeny were in important part aiming to 
achieve reliability and justness of outcomes, are the implicit empirics of the right 
to counsel really ripe for testing?  Others have explored at length what impact 
empirical evidence has and should have in constitutional decision-making 
generally, and doing so in the present context is beyond the scope of the project at 
hand.
224
  But it is worthy of future work by indigent defense scholars and careful 
consideration by advocates, as the prospect of a flowering of indigent defense 
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research is bound to press on the question of whether and to what extent Gideon is 
open to reconsideration if the evidence proves its factual assumptions flimsy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Essay has aimed to identify and provisionally evaluate an important 
trend in indigent defense policy: the push toward evidence-based practice.  The 
trend is “important” in several senses: The fruits of evidence-based endeavors 
could significantly alter indigent defense policymaking and practice; the 
prioritization of developing an evidence base could be, and to some extent has 
been, formative of the institutional structures for decision-making and oversight in 
the field; and the ethos of EBP might well alter professional and legal discourses 
that have long defined the field.  Given the decidedly mixed set of projections 
about EBP’s fate in and consequences for indigent defense, drawing a firm bottom 
line of assessment is nigh impossible.  But a few big picture observations are 
possible.  First, the legal, institutional, and financial investments that have been 
devoted to EBP to date give some confidence that the trend is not a passing fancy.  
Second, EBP’s devotees still face significant barriers to developing an indigent 
defense research base; equally so to inspiring optimal use of such research in 
policymaking.  Third, and perhaps most critically, advocates who aim to push on 
Gideon’s promise must be cautious and savvy about hitching their wagons to the 
evidence-based star: The research mission is not and cannot be (to capture the 
advantages advertised for it) goal-oriented, and the depth of the current evidence 
void in the field means that one cannot know with confidence what some of the 
emerging evidence will elucidate.  If Gideon by the numbers appears different 
from the idealized vision that has perdured, which should yield—the data or the 
vision?  That is the question that, if EBP is to take hold, may be put to all of us.     
